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Industry Integration and Stock Price Synchronicity 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides an alternative explanation of the negative relationship between price 
synchronicity and proprietary right protection that are uncorrelated to the information 
hypothesis. Using empirical data for 40 countries, we show that stock market volatility and 
firm size have significant impact on stock price synchronicity. We find significant correlations 
of international R2 disparity with industry structure integrations. The derived industry 
integration indices that capture industry correlations significantly explain cross-sectional and 
temporal variations in price synchronicity. The results imply that tighter industry integration 
leads to higher R2, and also explain away the property rights factor found in the information 
hypothesis. 
 
Keywords:  Price Synchronicity, Market Capitalization, Property Rights Protection, 
Industry Structures, Information Hypothesis, Market-wide risk 
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1. Introduction 
Roll (1988) suggests that high stock price synchronicity or high R2 corresponds to low firm-
specific price variation, which is usually caused by information inefficiency in the market. 
Many finance studies have since attempted to test the relationship of price synchronicity and 
information efficiency. In this paper, we find industry structure integration as an alternative 
factor explaining international R2 disparity, which is not related to an information-based reason 
as argued in some earlier studies. Using the derived industry integration indices to capture the 
effects of industry compositions and intra-industry firm correlations, we show that the indices 
significantly explain cross-sectional variations in price synchronicity as well as variations in 
R2 over time. The results imply that tighter industry integration leads to higher R2; and the 
results are independent of the property rights factor. 
In an important paper, Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) (referred to as MYY in the rest of this 
paper) show empirically that international stock price synchronicity varies considerably across 
40 countries in 1995. Their study shows that the private investor property rights, which are 
represented by the “good government index” (GGI) variable, significantly explain the cross-
sectional variation in R2 for different countries’ stocks. In countries with a low GGI and weak 
property right protection, investors do not expend enough private resources to extract 
information about firms, since any benefit from trading and owning shares of valuable firms 
may be dissipated because of the high risk of expropriation and inter-firm transfers that are not 
transparent to shareholders.  
Financial analyst coverage was investigated to see if more intense coverage led to higher 
information efficiency and thus lower price synchronicity. However, many studies indicated 
the opposite results that more analyst coverage led to higher price synchronicity. Financial 
analysts, especially in emerging countries with scant property rights, employ macro-economic 
market-wide information, instead of firm-specific information, to produce market reports that 
tend to move stock prices simultaneously, and result in a high R2 or price synchronicity. Some 
studies indirectly adduce price non-synchronicity as a strong presence of private information 
and show that under low R2, current returns have a strong predictability on futures earnings. 
Firms with lower R2 also display more effective corporate investment decisions and higher 
capital allocation efficiency.  
The direct evidence of low R2 associated with market information efficiency, however, remains 
elusive and inconclusive. The studies that show high R2 results argue that price processes are 
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efficient; whereas, others that show low R2 results argue that momentum processes with lagged 
price adjustments are inefficiency.  
In this paper, we first extend MYY’s study on international stock price synchronicity to cover 
the 18-year study period from 1995 through 2012. The GGI continues to provide supports for 
the information hypothesis, except for the years 2010 and 2011, in the country-level cross-
sectional regressions. We find that cross-section wise, local volatility represented by the 
standard deviation of local market index return is a significant explanatory variable as GGI for 
the cross-sectional variation in R2 in a number of years. This implies that stock return 
correlation with market return cross-sectionally increases with market return volatility, which 
is consistent with extant empirical results about analyst coverage impacting both volatility and 
R2. 
The main result in our study is that capitalization value (firm size) and industry market 
integration affect inter-country and intra-country differences in R2’s. By sorting listed firms of 
a country by the market capitalization into deciles, the average R2’s of the decile portfolios are 
explained by firm size in a significant way than by the country’s GGI, which becomes less 
important in explaining disaggregated R2’s. We explore how this size effect could be connected 
to industry market structure and the level of firm integration in the country. We construct value-
weighted industry integration indices by incorporating information on the country’s industry 
structure and degree of within-industry correlations to explain price synchronicity. This 
industry integration factor is as important as the GGI that represents the country’s degree of 
property rights protection.  
Industry market integration and size effect remain significance in explaining variations in 
𝑅2after controlling for country specific factors. First, we find that when the fixed country 
effects are introduced to the panel regression, the effect of GGI diminishes markedly resulting 
in estimated coefficient that is no longer significantly negative. Individual country culture is a 
plausible fixed effect in this regard. While we do not rule out the information hypothesis as a 
partial explanation of the cross-sectional variation in average stock return R2’s across countries, 
we believe that the stark international differences remain an issue to have yet been satisfactorily 
resolved. Second, the generally high average R2 observed in emerging countries versus the 
generally low average R2 observed in developed countries need not arise due to the assumption 
of selective information harvesting by analysts and also the assumption of information 
efficiency underlying the information hypothesis. The current literature is inconclusive on the 
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finding of whether a high R2 reflects price inefficiency, or a low R2 reflects price efficiency. 
For instance, in Li et at. (2014), R2 captures noise rather than firm-specific information;  and 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et at (2006)  find little support of using stock price synchronicity as a measure 
of firm-specific information internationally.  The story of selective gathering of market-wide 
information instead of firm-specific information suggests that smaller firms in emerging 
countries may face a higher R2 than larger firms in the same country, because investors would 
not expend resources to discover firm-specific information in anticipation of the high risk of 
losing property rights. In developed countries with better property right observances, we would 
not expect to see differential R2’s across firms of different size. There has been empirical 
evidence that larger firms tend to systematically display higher R2’s. We show in our study that 
indeed this is the case not just in U.S., but in all countries whether developed or emerging.  
The existing finance literature has documented differing property rights as the reason for 
observing the disparity in international stock price synchronicity. This reasoning requires the 
information hypothesis and a clear notion of linking R2 to market information efficiency. One 
key implication of our study is that the puzzle of international stock price synchronicity needs 
not be resolved using the information-based hypothesis. The disparity in R2’s across countries 
does not require any argument whether the stock market is (perfectly) informationally efficient 
or imperfectly informationally efficient given financial analysts’ reports, as long as there is 
some price impact upon such investor investigations. We believe that the phenomenon is 
plausibly linked to industrial organization matters and relative width of industrial development 
in each country. We derive the decile-based and industry-sector-based correlation indices to 
represent the level of industry integration in the sample countries, and added the indices in the 
panel regressions. We find consistent and positive correlations between the industry integration 
indices and price synchronicity in all models, which include country-panel, decile-panel, 
industry sector-panel and firm-level panel.  
For emerging and less developed countries, the growth and increased capitalization of firms 
lead to more investments in vertical and horizontal integrations, and thus increased R2’s, since 
listed firm’s stock prices tend to be more tightly knitted. On the other hand, for developed 
countries, the growth and increased capitalization of firms lead to more diversity and horizontal 
competition of industries. The latter reduces R2’s since the firms become more diversified, and 
their stock prices show more idiosyncratic variations. By disaggregating firms within each 
country into deciles by R2’s of these firms’ portfolios, we are able to discover the new findings 
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explaining variation of R2’s within country and variations of R2’s across countries. With the 
additional factors, the effect of GGI becomes insignificant. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of 
past studies related to the issue of stock return synchronicity. Section 3 discusses data sources, 
construction of key variables and regression specifications. Descriptive statistics are reported. 
Section 4 provides statistical analyses of the various regression models and examines the size 
effects on synchronicity. Section 5 investigates plausible effects of industry integration on the 
differential synchronicity across countries. Section 6 contains the conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
Roll (1988) finds a low R2 when fitting U.S. stock returns to standard asset pricing models and 
attributes the result to large residuals in firm-specific return variations or idiosyncratic risk. He 
further argues that information inefficiency causes high stock price synchronicity or R2 in a 
market, because firm-specific risks are not fully embedded, or reflected in stock prices. Since 
then, stock return R2 or stock price synchronicity has become a measure that is widely studied 
in the finance literature in conjunction with information issues.  
MYY (2000) produce an important study explaining the low synchronicity or R2 in developed 
countries, but high synchronicity or R2 in emerging or less developed countries. Using a good 
government index (“GGI”) that captures the levels of corruption, expropriation of investor 
property rights and repudiation of contracts, MYY find a negative correlation between GGI 
and aggregate stock return synchronicity across countries. They show that the negative 
correlation between country stock R2 and GGI is independent of macroeconomic fundamentals. 
In emerging countries where governments have poor track records of property rights protection, 
inter-corporate shifting of earnings by insiders discourages risk arbitrageurs to expend effort 
in extracting firm-specific information. In contrast, arbitrageurs will trade actively on firm-
specific information, if their private property rights are safely guarded. Suppose a market is 
efficient, risk arbitrageurs’ trades bring about quick adjustments in specific stock prices, and 
increase idiosyncratic return variations, which in turn contribute to a lower synchronicity or R2. 
Jin and Myers (2006) argue that poor property right protection alone is not enough to drive 
price synchronicity in the market. They suggest that opaqueness in firm-specific information 
is a necessary condition in driving price synchronicity. They propose a model in which 
opaqueness occurs because insiders to a firm and outside investors have asymmetric 
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information with regard to firm-specific news. Durnev, Morch and Yeung (2004) show that 
poor private property rights protection induces inter-corporate income shifting by corporate 
insiders and reduces informativeness of firm-specific factors. Durnev, Morck, Yeung and 
Zarowin (2003) find that low R2 stocks exhibit higher correlation between current returns and 
future earnings, indicating more relevant information captured in the prices.  
Financial analysts’ forecasts and reports have impact on stock prices. Ramnath, Rock, and 
Shane (2008) provide a comprehensive review of literature that shows the prevalent use of 
financial analysts’ reports in information studies. Related to the synchronicity issue, financial 
analysts’ coverage may proxy for the extent of information efficiency. While the earlier 
citations link information efficiency to lower price synchronicity, other studies appear to 
indicate the opposite.  
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) use a large number of US stocks between 1984 and 2000 to 
examine the roles of independent security analysts in processing market-wide and firm-specific 
information. Chan and Hameed (2006) use sample stocks from 25 emerging markets between 
1993 and 1999. Despite the difference in the samples used in the two studies, they both found 
a similar positive relationship between price synchronicity and security analysts’ coverage. 
They show that stock prices move more synchronously in markets covered by a large number 
of security analysts. While it is plausible for the results in Chan and Hameed (2006) to be 
consistent with the information hypothesis of MYY (2000) by assuming that analysts in 
emerging countries rely more on macroeconomic information to generate their earnings 
forecasts than using firm-specific information, it is more difficult to connect Piotroski and 
Roulstone’s (2004) results with MYY’s story. In Piotroski and Roulstone’s study, it is puzzling 
as to why security analysts do not generate more firm-specific price variations that cause low 
R2 in the developed markets such as in US. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) interpret their 
results as evidence of analysts specializing by industry using more industrywide and market-
wide information in their stock price coverage. Chan, Hameed, and Kang (2013) also find that 
synchronicity increases with liquidity in the stock trading.  
Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) find that inclusion in (deletion from) the Standard and 
Poor’s 500 index, which presumably increases (decreases) firm-level transparency, increases 
(decreases) stock return synchronicity. Ambrose, Lee and Peek (2007) find similar results in 
studying REITs. Other studies relate price synchronicity to investing styles (Barberis and 
Shleifer, 2003), wealth effect (Kyle and Xiong, 2001), financial constraints (Yuan, 2005), 
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portfolio rebalancing activities (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002), and strategic trading (Pasquariello 
and Vega 2007). In related papers, Wurgler (2000) finds that capital allocation efficiency 
increases with firm-specific information as well as legal protection of minority investors. Chen, 
Goldstein and Jiang (2007) use price non-synchronicity as a measure of private information 
and show that it has a strong positive effect on corporate investment decisions. 
The direct evidence of low R2 associated with market information efficiency is not conclusive. 
MYY (2013) use dynamics to reconcile these conflicting results in the causality of firm-specific 
return volatility. However, the two recent studies find evidence to refute the idea that the high 
R2 of stocks in less developed countries is due to opaqueness of firm-specific information. 
Firstly, Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) show that lumpy time-variant firm-specific information 
is efficiently impounded into current stock prices, thus causing smaller future price variations 
and higher price synchronicity, when the market is transparent. They explain that investors’ 
learning about time-invariant fundamentals increases price synchronicity of older firms relative 
to those in younger firms. They state that contrary to the conventional wisdom, stock price 
synchronicity or R2 increases when transparency improves, but not the other way around. 
Secondly, Hou, Peng and Xiong (2013) argue that countries or markets with low R2 need not 
be more informationally efficient. They propose an alternative setting that explains stock return 
variance based on investor sentiment instead of pure information. Thrit empirical evidence in 
both the US and emerging markets supports the behavioral finance theory by showing that 
lower R2 is associated with stronger medium-term price momentum and longer-term price 
reversal, which are contrary to the market efficiency explanation. There are other studies, such 
as Ashbaugh-Skaife, Gassen, and LaFond (2005), which find little empirical support for 
interpreting stock price synchronicity as a measure of firm-specific information; and Pantzalis 
and Xu (2008) argue that it is inappropriate to view low synchronicity as indicative of high 
stock price informativeness. 
In the following sections, we show empirical evidence for an alternative explanation of the 
disparity in R2’s across countries, which does not require the stock market to be informationally 
efficient. Our explanation also does not require the assumption that analysts in less developed 
countries report more of macroeconomic news, and less of firm-specific news. 
3. Data, Empirical Variables, and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1.  Stock return synchronicity as dependent variable 
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We collected weekly stock price data for all public firms on stock exchanges in the same 40 
countries as those used in MYY’s (2000) study from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream. Based on 
the cut-off date as on 31 December 2012, we exclude newly listed stocks with stock return data 
that are less than ten weeks from the cut-off date. A stock must have at least 40 weeks of return 
data before it is included in our sample. We exclude stocks with no trading data within a week, 
and stocks with outlier weekly returns exceeding 25% in order to reduce measurement errors 
that may bias the results.  
Unlike MYY (2000) who use biweekly (fortnightly) returns, we use weekly returns in our 
empirical analyses. Jin and Myers (2006) also use weekly returns. The two-week-long thin-
trading problem suggested in MYY is no longer a serious issue for most of the countries in the 
ensuing years after 1995, and we believe that the use of higher frequency return data improve 
estimation and testing efficiencies due to a larger sample size. We compute the weekly stock 
return as the difference in natural logarithm of stock prices, and as in MYY, we adjust a lag of 
one day for the U.S. market return relative to returns of other Far East countries in order to 
synchronize their timings as much as is possible.  
The final sample covers an average of 26,780 stocks each year across the 40 countries during 
the years from 1995 to 2012. This gives a total of 475,701stock-year sample. The number of 
stocks increased at a uniform rate. The total number of stocks used in our study increases from 
15,490 stocks in 1995 to 32,322 stocks in 2012. 
3.2. Stock Price Synchronicity Measures 
We use the same country-level regression model as in France and Roll (1986), Roll (1988), and 
also MYY (2000) to compute the R2 by fitting weekly return rijt of stock i in country j in week 
t :  
𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1,𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑖𝑗[𝑟𝑈𝑆,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑗𝑡] + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡   (1) 
where rm,jt is the continuously compounded local stock market return; rUS,t is the continuously 
compounded US stock market return; ejt is the log of the local currency relative to US dollar 
from week t-1 to week t; and [rUS,t +ejt] is the US stock return in a local currency term, which 
is included to account for foreign funds flow effect in investing in the global US market. ij, 
1,ij and 2,ij are regression coefficients, and ijt is an i.i.d. residual error.  
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For each individual firm i of each country starting from 1995 to 2012, the weekly returns are 
fitted with least squares regressions year by year as in Equation (1) using one full year of 
weekly return data. We obtain the firm-year 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑦
2 , where y indicates the respective year 1995, 
1996,…..,2012, for each regression. Based on the firm-year 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑦
2 , which measures the 
proportion of stock return variance in firm i of country j that is explained by local stock market 
return rm,jt and currency-adjusted US stock market return rUS,t, we compute weighted average 
𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑦
2 ’s for all stocks i in country j in year y. We use two different weighting schemes, which 
include the error-weighted (ERW) scheme as in MYY, and the equal-weighted (EQW) scheme. 
The ERW scheme uses the fraction of TSS for each firm to the overall TSS as weight. The 
EQW scheme gives an equal weight to each firm’s R2. The error-weighted country-year R2, or 
ERW, is given by: 
𝐸𝑅𝑊𝑗𝑦 =  
∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑦
2 × 𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖
∑ 𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖
=  
∑ 𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖
∑ 𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖
     (2) 
where TSS denotes the total sum of squares of regression errors, and ESS denotes the explained 
sum of squares of regression errors. The equal-weighted country-year R2, or EQW, is given by 
𝐸𝑄𝑊𝑗𝑦 =  
∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑦
2
𝑖
𝑁𝑗𝑦
        (3) 
where Njy denotes the number of firms deployed in the regression in country j in year y. EQW 
R2 is a viable alternative measure to ERW R2. It puts an equal weight on all firms’ R2’s in each 
country. As TSS is mostly larger for smaller firms, the smaller firms tend to have lower R2, 
and ERW R2 may bias downward from the EQW R2. In general, the EQW values are higher 
than ERW. Equal weighting is used in some recent studies, such as Eun, Wang, and Xiao (2015). 
For regression purposes, we transform ERW R2 and EQW R2 from the bounded interval of [0, 
1] using the logistic transformation process as in MYY:  
𝑗𝑦 = log (
𝑅𝑗𝑦
2
1−𝑅𝑗𝑦
2 )        (4) 
where Rjy
2 is equal to ERW R2 or else EQW R2.  𝑗𝑦 is used as the dependent variable in 
subsequent regressions. For exposition purposes, we may sometimes conveniently refer to this 
log-transform of ERW R2 as LERW, and log-transform of EQW R2 as LEQW. 
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For industry level aggregation, we aggregate the firm-year 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑦
2  across each industry k 
following error-weighted scheme and equal weighted scheme. The industry classification is 
primary based on 4-digit sic code. Furthermore, we integrate those industries with only 1 firm 
by using the 2 digit sic code for each year, and each country. 
3.3. Good Government Index (GGI) 
MYY constructed a good government index (GGI) based on three indexes that are “corruption 
index”, “risk of expropriation index” and “repudiation of contracts by government index” from 
La Porta, Lopez De-Silanes and Shleifer (1998).1 The three indexes assign scores ranging from 
zero to ten for each country included in the survey. A low score indicates a government’s low 
respect of private property rights. MYY use the sum of the three index scores to derive the 
GGI index in their empirical tests. They found that governments with low GGI are associated 
with their country stock markets having high synchronicity in stock prices.  
However, due to the difficulty in replicating and extending exactly the same three MYY (2000) 
indexes to later years, we use the closest proxy indexes available to create a comparable GGI 
that shares the same characteristics of MYY’s GGI. We use the “corruption perception index” 
(CPI) published by Transparency International and a component indicator representing 
“property right” in the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), an index jointly published by the 
Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation, to construct our GGI. These indices are 
publicly available. We normalize the two indexes on the scale of 0 to 10, where 10 is the 
highest score. For the normalized CPI, a score of 10 indicates that a country is perceived to be 
the least corrupt. For the normalized property right indicator in IEF, a score of 10 indicates the 
lowest risk of expropriation by the government2. A score of zero represents the extremes of 
corruption and highest risk of expropriation. We collect the yearly scores of CPI and IEF’s 
property right index for the 40 countries from 1995 to 2012. Our GGI index is the sum of the 
scores of the two normalized indexes. A high GGI score indicates that a country j has relatively 
low levels of perceived corruption and expropriation risks either through “outright confiscation” 
or “forced nationalization” by the government.  
                                                          
1  See La Porta et al (1998) for detailed descriptions of the three indexes.  
2  The Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) assigns the highest score of 100 to a country that fits into the criteria: 
“Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces contracts efficiently and quickly. 
The justice system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property. There is no corruption or 
expropriation.” 
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3.4. Control and Structural variables 
Following MMY, we employ the natural log of per capita GDP in nominal U.S. dollar (GDP) 
and logarithm of the number of stocks listed on each country’s exchange (NSTK) as control 
variables. Both variables are closely related to the size of the stock market. If the size is small, 
then the individual stock returns will be more closely associated with the market index, which 
is a weighted average of the individual stock returns, and this will in turn affect the R2’s. Thus 
the control variables should remove the impact on R2 due to this technicality. 
As in MYY, we use the same set of structural variables for the price synchronicity regressions 
(see their Tables 4 and 5). These structural variables are postulated to have some effects on the 
dependent variable of price synchronicity. These variables include the natural log of 
geographical size in square kilometers for each country j (GEOj), and the variance of the 
quarterly GDP growth data from the last five years (VGDPj). Structural variables also include 
the Herfindahl indexes and earnings co-movement index described as follows. 
We use the MYY’s approach to compute an earnings co-movement index for each firm i in 
each country j and year y by first regressing firm i’s returns on assets or ROAijy on the market 
value-weighted average of the returns on assets of all firms in country j of year y, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑚,𝑗𝑦. 
   𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑦 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑚,𝑗𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑦 .     (5) 
The R2’s obtained from the regressions of ROA’s of all firms i in the same country j for year 
y, denoted as  𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑦 
2 (𝑅𝑂𝐴), are then averaged in an analogous way to the error-weighting 
scheme for returns regressions. The weight for each ROA R2 is the fraction of TSS to the total 
TSS for all firm ROA regressions in country j. Thus the country j earnings co-movement index 
(ECI) is computed as  
𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑗𝑦 =  
∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑦 
2 (𝑅𝑂𝐴)×𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑦(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖
∑ 𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑦(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖
=  
∑ 𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑦(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖
∑ 𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑦(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖
 .    (6) 
The ECIj,y is estimated using firm ROAijy data for the previous 5 years. All the data used in 
computing the structural variables are collected from Datastream. There are minor differences 
in the way we compute the ECI here. MYY (2000) drop some countries in the ECI calculations 
because “…earnings data are available for very few firms…”; whereas, we prefer to use 
whatever number of firms that are available (Poland has the smallest number of 60 stocks), and 
we have a complete set of ECI variables in all 40 countries for all the years from 1995 to 2012. 
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We use ex-ante data, for example, 1991-1994 for computing ECI in 1995, rather than using 
1993-1997 for computing ECI in 1995.  
We use yearly total sales of all listed firms on each country’s exchange to compute proxies for 
economic specialization or diversification. Let Sij denote the annual sales of a firm i in country 
j and Skj denote the aggregate sales of firms in industry k in country j. We compute the industry-
based Herfindahl index as 𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗 = ∑ (
𝑆𝑘𝑗
∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
)
2
𝐾
𝑘=1  and firm-based Herfindahl index as 
𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗 = ∑ (
𝑆𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
)
2
𝑁
𝑖=1   respectively, where K denotes the total number of industry sectors 
in country j, and N denotes the total number of firms in country j. A large industry-Herfindahl 
index indicates a lack of industry diversity, while a large firm-based Herfindahl index indicates 
dominance of a small number of firms.  
In addition to the explanatory variables used in MYY, we consider the average capitalization 
values of firms in each country. For any firm in a year, its number of shares at year-end is 
multiplied by the firm’s year-end stock price to obtain a capitalization value. To put 
capitalization values of all firms on the same footing across all countries, we convert the values 
into US dollars using the year-end exchange rates. For any country in any year, the firm’s 
average capitalization variable in our regressions is the natural logarithm of the equal-weighted 
average of dollar capitalizations across all firms in the country. After grouping the firms in a 
country into 10 deciles sorted by dollar capitalization, we compute the associated decile 
regression variable denoted by ACAP as the log of the equal-weighted average of dollar 
capitalizations of firms within the decile. We employ average capitalization on a per firm basis 
to match with the dependent variable of average stock return R2 or its transform. The aggregate 
capitalization variable, which is closely correlated with NSTK, would not provide additional 
useful information. 
We compute another variable, which is the sample standard deviation or volatility of the 52-
week natural log- local stock returns each year for each of the 40 countries, and denote it as 
IVOL. This variable captures the amount of news in the market; and more news leads to higher 
market volatility, and hence, affects the price synchronicity in one way or another. We do not 
differentiate whether the market volatility is due to either market-wide information or 
idiosyncratic news. Suppose macro-economic wide news increases market volatility within a 
country or across countries, we expect such news to move stock prices synchronously and lead 
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to higher price synchronicity. A list of variables with the descriptions and the abbreviations is 
given in the Appendix 1.  
3.5. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for the key variables 
used in our study. The aggregate country level statistics are computed year-by-year for the 40 
countries covering the periods 1995-2012. Out of the 18 years, the EQW averages across all 
countries are higher than ERW in 12 years. When it occurs, the error weights using sum of 
squared residuals are usually larger for the small capitalization firms that tend also to have 
lower R2. However, where TSS is non-monotonic, average ERW can be higher than EQW.3  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Tables 2a, b, c, and d show the values for selected variables used in our study for all countries 
in the snapshot years 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. The countries are partitioned into a 
developed country group and a developing or emerging country group, based largely on a per 
capita GDP level. 
[Insert Tables 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d here] 
From Table 2a, we see that ERW and EQW R2’s of all the countries vary non-monotonically 
through time; though there was a general drop in 2005, and subsequent peaking around 2010 
to 2011, when the global financial crisis was abated. A number of developing countries, such 
as Malaysia, Pakistan, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, and Taiwan, and the developed country of 
Korea show a gradual drop in the country R2 over the 18 years. Most developed countries see 
an increase in country R2 over the 18 years. Although GDP per capita for countries, such as 
Canada, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, U.K., China, Czech, Chile, Columbia, India, and 
Indonesia, increase at a fast pace; whereas, others such as Hong Kong, Japan, Peru, Taiwan, 
and Thailand increase more slowly. On average across all countries, GDP per capita increases 
at a compounded rate of about 4.6% per year. Until the global financial crisis and Euro-Debt 
market crisis, the fast growing countries, such as Australia, China, Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, and Spain, saw a large number of new IPOs, which increases total share in the 
capital market. Many older European economies, and other capital markets in the developing 
                                                          
3 The panel-level descriptive statistics are also computed, and shown in Appendix 3 due to space constraints. 
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economies, such as Columbia, Czech, and Mexico, saw stagnation or mergers into bigger 
companies.  
In Table 2b, the number of listed stocks in some cases decreases due to stringent liquidity 
conditions used in our study, which retain only liquid stocks with weekly trading data. During 
the global financial crisis and after that, many smaller stocks in developing countries saw a 
huge drop in trading volumes and liquidity. 
In Table 2c, we see that the industry Herfindahl indices of many countries decrease over the 
years signifying a more diversified economy. China, Thailand, Germany, and Holland show 
noticeable decreases. However, other countries, such as Denmark, Finland, South Africa, and 
Taiwan show noticeable increases in the IHHI. Decreases in most countries’ firm level 
Herfindahl index signifying the dominance of a small number of firms in the economy in terms 
of decreased sale revenues over time. There were a few exceptions in both the developed and 
the developing economies, such as Denmark, Finland, Singapore, Czech, Greece, Malaysia, 
South Africa, and Taiwan. Across the broad groupings of developed versus developing 
countries, IHHI was markedly higher for developing countries except for more recent years 
since 2010. On the other hand, developing countries have on average unequivocally higher 
IHHI’s compared to those in developed economies. This shows systematic differences in 
industry and business market structures of developed versus developing economies. 
In Table 2d, the good government index GGI of more of the developing countries falls or stays 
about the same level over the years excluding Brazil, China, India, Pakistan, and Thailand. On 
the contrary, GGI for most of the developed countries increases or stays about the same level 
over the years, except for Austria, Holland, Japan, and Portugal that see decreases. If GGI is 
an important explanation of international differences in R2, particularly with respect to 
developed and developing countries, this explanation continues to be effective in the years 
following 1995 after MYY’s study. 
For individual country’s market index volatility IVOL, it is interesting to note that while those 
in the developed economies tend to rise; those in the developing economies tend to fall. 
Volatility in the developing economies in the 1990’s is relatively higher than in the developed 
markets. By 2010, their volatilities pull to about the same levels. Most of the volatility changes 
appear to take place around and after the global financial crisis periods in 2007 and 2008. The 
average firm capitalizations do no increase as large as per capita GDP in most cases. There is 
an even spread of increases, as well as decreases in average capitalizations in both the 
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developed and developing economies. There are no trend differences in average capitalizations 
between the two groups of countries, which explain the cross-sectional disparity issue in R2. 
4. Empirical Methodology and Findings 
In this section, we extend MYY (2000)’s results for all years from 1995 to 2012. We use the 
log-transforms of error-weighted R2 (ERW) and equal-weighted R2 (EQW) as alternative 
dependent variables in the regressions, and analyze the substantive impact of GGI on the two 
response variables. Other explanatory variables are included to explain the cross-sectional 
variations across countries. Finally, we provide possible alternative explanations for the 
disparity in R2 across countries. 
4.1. Extending MYY’s results 
The first part of the empirical analyses replicate and extend the results in MYY (2000), which 
use only the cross-sectional data in 1995. We estimate the R2 regressions to examine both 
cross-sectional and temporal variations in the GGI variable for a panel of 40 countries on a 
year-by-year basic controlling for various macro-economic and firm-level fundamentals. The 
generic empirical framework is set up as follows:  
𝑗𝑦 = a0 + 𝑏1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑦 + 𝑏2𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑦 + 𝑐𝑋𝑗𝑦 + 𝛿𝐺𝐺𝐼𝑗𝑦+𝑗𝑦   (7) 
where GDPjy is the natural log of per capita GDP of country j in year y; NSTKjy is the log-
number of stocks in country j in year y which represents the economic scale or size of economic 
activities; GGIjy is the good government index, which is a proxy for the level of property rights 
protection in a country; and Xjy is a vector of the structural variables including GEOj, the 
logarithm of geographical area in square kilometres (km2) of country j, macroeconomic risk 
proxy, VGDPjy, the Herfindahl indexes, IHHIjy and FHHIjy, and the earnings co-movement 
index, ECIjy . The regression parameters are denoted by constants a0, b1, b2, , and constant 
vector  c. jy is assumed to be an i.i.d. error term for every j in each year y, when we employ 
OLS. 
In terms of empirical methodology, we make two extensions to the earlier empirical works of 
MYY (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006). First, we extend the sample periods covering 1995 to 
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2012,4 and we have 18 years of cross-sectional results in comparison with MYY’s 1995 study. 
We run both cross-sectional and time series analyses on this panel data. Second, as additional 
robustness checks, we employ an alternative dependent variable in the form of the log-
transform of an equal-weighted aggregate R2 in addition to that of error-weighted R2 employed 
in MYY. In particular, we run two pairs of cross-sectional regressions on Equation (7) for each 
year: one with LERW as dependent variable, and another one with LEQW as dependent 
variable. The results are reported in Tables 3a and 3b. 
[Insert Tables 3a and 3b here] 
MYY (2000) show that the control and structural variables, such as GDP, NSTK, GEO, VGDP, 
IHHI, FHHI, and ECI, explain only partially the high correlations of the fundamental 
influences in the low-income economies. The correlations of fundamental influences possibly 
give rise to higher synchronicity or R2 in their stock markets. However, when they include GGI 
in the model, they found that GGI explains away the R2 variations correlated with GDP, and 
the GGI is significantly negative in the model. Their results support an institutional story that 
a government’s weak protection of property rights causes high stock return synchronicity in 
the sample countries. 
We extend MYY’s model in Equation (7) by using year-by-year data from 1995 to 2012, and 
find that without GGI, GDP has a negative impact on the dependent synchronicity variable 
with significance at a 10% level in 10 out of 18 years for LERW, and 6 out of 18 years for 
LEQW. However, when we include GGI as an explanatory variable, the results in Tables 3a-
3d show that GDP coefficient becomes insignificantly different from zero, but the coefficient 
of GGI is significantly negative at the 10% level in all cases for the LERW models, except for 
year 2011. The GGI coefficient is also significantly negative at the 10% level for the LEQW 
models, except for years 2010 and 2011. 
In Jin and Myers (2006) study, they show that after controlling for GDP and stock market size, 
as represented by the total number stocks listed on a market, NSTK, stock return synchronicity 
is higher in countries where firms are more opaque. Like Jin and Myers, we add the country 
stock market index volatility, IVOL, as a structural explanatory variable representing 
macroeconomic risk in a country, to the cross-sectional price synchronicity models. The local 
stock index data are obtained from Datastream. In Tables 3c and 3d, when IVOL is included 
                                                          
4  MYY (2000) use only cross-section data in 1995, whereas Jin and Myers (2006) estimate the models using 
year-by-year data for the periods from 1990 to 2001. 
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in the cross-sectional regressions, GGI remains significantly negative, while IVOL itself is 
significantly positive in 9 out of 18 years for LERW, and in 10 out of 18 years for LEQW. The 
estimated IVOL coefficient is consistently positive for all cases indicating that market volatility 
adds new information to price synchronicity. 
[Insert Tables 3c and 3d here] 
 
4.2. Emerging versus developed market regimes 
To further understand the relationship between price synchronicity and property rights, we plot 
error weighted R2 (ERW) against GGI for the 40 countries for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. 
The 40 countries  
[Insert Figures 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d here] 
Figure 1a shows that in 1995, the developed countries (solid dots) cluster on the right bottom 
of the graph, whereas the developing countries (circles) spread out to the left with a few on the 
left top corner of the graph. In particular, the left uppermost point represents China, whereas 
the lowest point on the far right represents US, which are the two distinctly polar economies in 
1995. There are other explanatory variables that seem to explain the cross-sectional variations 
in ERW or LERW in addition to the control and structural variables. If these other explanations 
are weaker, then GGI would appear to be able to partition the cross-section of points into two 
clusters, such that one on the left (the developing countries) has high ERW R2 and the other on 
the right (the developed countries) has low ERW R2.  
This helps us understands why the regression model in Equation (7) produces a significantly 
negative slope on GGI. This international R2 disparity phenomenon could be explained by other 
economically meaningful variables that divide the two groups of countries into a left and a right 
partition. These economic variables partially explain the disparity in the international R2’s. 
However, over time, as seen in particularly in Figure 1d, the R2’s of the two groups of countries 
become more similar, though the GGI differences persist. For the other variables that are 
effective in explaining cross-sectional variations of R2’s, their plots with ERW and EQW are 
rather similar to the Figures 1a-1d.  
Chan and Hameed (2006) show that in emerging markets, if firm size were correlated with 
price synchronicity, high price synchronicity is likely to be linked with high analyst coverage. 
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Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) use firm size to partly explain price informativeness. We 
conjecture that the divide between emerging markets and developed markets is correlated with 
the market size effects. We test the hypothesis by using two proxies for market size effects, 
which include the total number of stocks, NSTK, and the average firm capitalization, ACAP,; 
and both variables measure economic size and activities in a country, which are also correlated 
with the extent of analysts’ coverage. 
 
4.3. Market Size Effects 
We explore the market capitalization effects by splitting firms into 10 deciles by market size 
for country j, and in year y. We aggregate firm-level  𝑅𝑑𝑗𝑦
2  by decile, and make the usual log-
transformation of EQW R2 for each decile in j and year y is defined as 𝑑𝑗𝑦 =
log  𝑅𝑑𝑗𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑑𝑗𝑦
2 ). 
The country-year cross-sectional regressions in Equation (7) (as in Tables 3a to 3d) produce 
overly restrictive single constant coefficient, 𝛾, which could cause misspecification on the 
explanatory relationship between 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑑𝑗𝑦 and 𝑑𝑗𝑦. We relax the constraint on the 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑑𝑗𝑦 
coefficient being a constant across d and j using the panel structure, where includes 400 
coefficients 𝛾𝑑,𝑗  for d=1,2,3,…,10 for the 10 deciles and j=1,2,….,40 for each of the 40 
countries. Thus, instead of having only 40 sample points in the cross-sectional country-level 
regressions, we now run regressions using a sample size of 40  10 (40 countries each with 10 
deciles) over 18 years using the following decile-based panel regression specification: 
𝑑𝑗𝑦 = a0 + 𝑏1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑦 + 𝑏2𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑦 + 𝑐𝑋𝑗𝑦 + 𝛿𝐺𝐺𝐼𝑗𝑦       
                            + ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑑𝑗  𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑑𝑗𝑦
10
𝑑=1
40
𝑗=1 + 𝜌𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑗𝑦 + 𝜃𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑗𝑦 + 𝑑𝑗𝑦 .   (8) 
where 𝑑𝑗𝑦  is the log-transform of EQW R
2 for each decile in country j and year y; and we 
include  log of equal-weighted firm capitalization, 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑑𝑗𝑦, of all firms in decile d of j in year 
y. In regression (8), a constant coefficient 𝛾 is employed for all 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑑𝑗𝑦 explanatory variables. 
For different decile 𝑑𝑗𝑦 in the same country j and year y, the explanatory variables of 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑦 , 
𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑗𝑦, 𝑋𝑗𝑦 , 𝐺𝐺𝐼𝑗𝑦, and 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑗𝑦 have the same values. These values differ by j and by y. 
As the disturbance term 𝑑𝑗𝑦  may be heteroskedastic across deciles, we perform the least 
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squares regression on (8) for each year during 1995 – 2012 considering different variances in 
the disturbance error terms in different deciles.  
If market size is irrelevant, we should not expect the disaggregation of 𝑗𝑦 in Equation (7) into 
𝑑𝑗𝑦 in Equation (8) to alter significantly the nature of the impact of GGI according to the 
information hypothesis in MYY. The level of investors’ property right protection in a country 
should affect all firms in the country consistently, and thus the GGI explanatory variable should 
have the same negative impact on each 𝑑𝑗𝑦 for different deciles. This is the same approach 
used in Pantzalis and Xu (2008), who study issues on information using US sample. The results 
are summarized in Table 4. The “goodness of fit” (adjusted R2) of the decile-based cross-
sectional models improves significantly relative to the country-level LEQW model in Equation 
(7). Apparently, the disaggregation into decile groups improves the explanation of the 
dispersion in R2’s across countries. There is substantive variation in the within-country decile 
R2’s that justifies the explanation by firm sizes in conjunction with other structural variables. 
The GDP coefficient retains the correct negative sign in almost every year except for 2009. 
The GGI coefficient is significantly negative at 1% level in all the years. Similarly, the IVOL 
coefficient is significantly positive at the 1% level for 15 out of 18 years. It is significantly 
positive at the 2% level for 2007. More interestingly, the ACAP coefficient estimates are 
significantly positive in all years at less than 1% significance level. The positive ACAP 
coefficient indicates that larger firm lead to higher firm R2, and hence contributes to the higher 
overall R2 of the country. The effect appears to be the same and robust across both developed 
and developing countries. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.4. Robustness Tests - Panel Regressions 
Instead of running the country-level cross-sectional OLS models across different years, we 
estimate Equation (8) as a country-year panel model. We consider the same set of control 
variables, such as GDP and NSTK, and the structural variables of GEO, VGDP, IHHI, FHHI, 
and ECI. We also include three additional explanatory variables: GGI, ACAP, and IVOL, and 
also year fixed effects, y, to the model.  The new model specification is as follow: 
𝑗𝑦 = a0 + 𝑏1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑦 + 𝑏2𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑦 + 𝑐𝑋𝑗𝑦 + 𝛿𝐺𝐺𝐼𝑗𝑦+ 𝛾𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑑𝑗𝑦 +  𝜌𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑗𝑦 + 𝑦 + 𝑗𝑦
            (9) 
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The country-year panel regression results in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 are robust 
reaffirming the negative correlations between GGI and R2 as found in the early results of the 
country-level cross-sectional models as in Table 3(c) and 3(d). We find that the GGI 
coefficients are statistically and economically significant in the models; and the sign of the 
coefficients are negative. The GGI explain about 2.7% and 3.3% of the variations in the 
country-level LERW (error-weighted R2) and LEQR (equal-weighted R2), respectively. The 
IVOL coefficients are significant and positive across the models, which are also consistent with 
the early country-year models. We note that IVOL and GGI coefficients are not mutually 
exclusive, and both appear to be consistent and robust in the models. The results do not reject 
the opaqueness hypothesis of Jin and Myers (2006) that argues that the market opaqueness is a 
necessary condition for the negative effects of weak property right protection on price 
informativeness; and both are significant factors in explaining the variations in price 
synchronicity, though in the opposite direction.  
In contrary to the distinct divisions between the emerging economies and the developed 
economies shown in Figures 1 (a) to (d), we find that the three market structure variables that 
represent both firm size (ACAP) and market concentration (IHHI and FHHI) are insignificant 
in explaining the international disparity of price synchronicity in the country-year panel 
regressions. The results seem to imply that the structural divides between emerging countries 
and developed countries are not correlated with the market capitalization (ACAP) and 
competitiveness (or concentration) of firms (FHHI) and the industry (IHHI) in the country. 
There are two possible reasons why firm size and market concentration fail to explain cross-
country disparity in R2’s: (1) the country-level panel models are too coarse to capture the 
between-the-countries effects in size and industry structure; and (2) the structural divides 
between developed and developing countries could be related to the maturity and integration 
of industries within the country. 
A recent paper by Eun, Wang, and Xiao (2014) shows that cultural differences across countries 
could explain the cross-sectional disparity in country R2’s. The findings are highly plausible 
on the premise that cultural differences, to some extent, correlate with the globalization and 
developmental states of a country. We further conjecture a non-information-based hypothesis 
that firms in large markets attract more institutional fund flows, and greater security analyst 
coverage (Chan and Hameed, 2006; Kelly, 2014). The hypothesis, if not rejected, should 
predict a strong correlation between stock return R2 and market capitalization (size), i.e. we 
should expect a positive and significant ACAP coefficient in the models.  
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We estimate the decile-country-based panel regression model by adding the country fixed 
effects (Columns 3 and 4) to capture unobserved county-level differences, (such as cultural 
differences); and the decile fixed effects (Columns 5 and 6) to capture size-related fixed effect. 
The new regression specification is as follows: 
𝑑𝑗𝑦 = a0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗1𝑗
38
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑑
9
𝑑=1 1𝑑 + 𝑏1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑦 + 𝑏2𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑦 + 𝑐𝑋𝑗𝑦       
                      +𝛿𝐺𝐺𝐼𝑗𝑦 + ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑑𝑗 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑑𝑗𝑦
10
𝑑=1
40
𝑗=1 + 𝜌𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑗𝑦 + 𝜃𝐿𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑗𝑦 + 𝑑𝑗𝑦  (10) 
where the indicator 1j denotes 1, if a dependent variable is associated with country j; and 0 
otherwise; and the indicator 1d denotes 1, if dependent variable is associated with decile d; and 
0 otherwise. Regression (10) is therefore a panel regression involving time series as well as 
cross-sections of the country-decile variables. The sample values of the dependent variable for 
regression (10) is a stacked vector of  (𝑍1995 𝑍1996 𝑍1997  …  𝑍𝑦 … 𝑍2011 𝑍2012)
𝑇
 where each 
(4001) 𝑍𝑦  is (11𝑦 2,1𝑦...𝑑1𝑦...10,1𝑦  1,2𝑦...  10,2𝑦 1,3𝑦...10,3𝑦…1,40𝑦…10,40𝑦)
𝑇 . To 
avoid singularity, we exclude the tenth decile dummy, and two country dummies (since GEO 
variable is constant for each country). To ensure that the panel regression results are adequately 
interpreted, we follow the method of Petersen (2009) to adjust the standard errors of estimates 
by checking if the residual errors of the panel data regression are correlated. Both within-
country cluster and within-decile cluster correlations are considered. The empirical results of 
the regression are reported in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The sample size for this regression is 400  18 years or 7200. The adjusted R2 for the decile-
country-based panel regressions increase to between 0.466 and 0.506 compared to the adjusted 
R2 of around 0.186 and 0.193 (Columns 1 and 2) in Table 5. It is clearly the case that the 
restrictions:  (𝛾𝑑𝑗 = 𝛾 ), for all d and all j, can be rejected. The relaxation of these restrictions 
increases the fit in Equation (10) tremendously relative to the regression in Equation (9).  
In Table 5, the ACAP coefficient is highly significant and positive at 1% level in model where 
the country fixed effects are controlled (Columns 3 and 4), and when both the country and 
decile fixed effects are controlled. GGI and IVOL coefficients are both positive but not 
significant at less than a 10% level. It seems to suggest that unobserved within-the-country and 
within-the-firm-decile variations could explain away some of the between-the-country price 
synchronicity effects that are associated with market opaqueness, (IVOL), and weak property 
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right protection, (GGI). However, the results on the highly statistically and economically 
significant ACAP coefficients (Columns 3 to 6) imply that the unobserved within-the-country 
and within-the-firm-decile variations are uncorrelated with the average capitalization of firms 
in the countries.  
A closer examination into the decile dummies (results not reported) shows that developed 
countries’ first decile coefficients are more negative than developing countries’ coefficients. 
The regression results are consistent with the initial observations of Figures 2a, 2b – that there 
is a distinct difference in the impact of decile capitalization on the associated R2. In the 
developed countries group, on average, only the first six deciles or the largest firms evidence 
positive coefficients, whereas in the developing group countries only the last decile or the 
smallest firms may evidence negative coefficients. Thus, developed countries’ overall R2 is 
lower than the developing countries’ overall R2. The results imply that smaller firms contribute 
less to aggregate R2 than the larger firms do in all countries. Given that smaller firms have 
fewer analysts following than large firms, the results seem to be inconsistent with the 
information hypothesis that smaller firms are informationally more efficient relative to larger 
firms.    
4.4.1. Sector-Country-based Panel  
We further investigate the relationship between within-the-industry sector variations and price 
synchronicity   using the sector-country panel. We group the sample firms into 30 industry 
sectors based on the Fama-French industry classifications (See Appendix 2). Both the country 
and the industry sector fixed effects are controlled for; and the results are reported in Columns 
(7) and (8) of Table 5. The models’ goodness-of-fit remains reasonably strong at between 0.371 
and 0.423.  
By extending the observations from 720 in the decile-country panel to 15,218 in the sector-
country panel, the results show that ACAP coefficients are still significant and positive. We 
could not reject the market size effects in explaining the disparity of international R2. The 
market opaqueness variable, IVOL, is positive but statistically insignificant; and the GGI 
coefficients are still significant, but the sign changes from negatives as in the earlier country-
panel regressions (Columns 1 and 2) to positives in after controlling for sector-country fixed 
effects. It suggests that GGI is no longer proxy for the information-based effects. The weak 
GGI increases price synchronicity for countries with larger firms. The size effect is not linked 
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to information opaqueness, IVOL, neither correlated with industry and market structures, IHHI 
and FHHI.   
4.5. Alternative explanations of stock return synchronicity 
The country-year panel models are the only models thus far that produce results (Columns 1 
and 2 of Table 5) that do not reject the information hypothesis of MYY. However, the MYY’s 
hypothesis could not withstand the robustness tests that allow for unobserved decile-based and 
industry sector-based variations. The information based results disappear, when we 
disaggregate R2’s by portfolios of stocks and include different average capitalizations in each 
country in our models. The negative explanatory relationships of GGI and R2 become 
insignificant, when we control for the within-the-decile and the within-the-sector variations in 
the panel regression models. In the sector-country panel models, GGI remains significant but 
the sign becomes positive. There are three possible explanations for the positive GGI and R2 
relationship.  
One is the information reason related to a conjecture on how financial analysts report on firms. 
Chan and Hameed (2006) find that stocks with low return R2 are smaller in capitalization, with 
low institutional ownerships and less analyst coverage and liquidity. As large firms tend to 
attract more security analyst coverage, and security analysts are efficient processors of market-
wide information, stock returns are more synchronous in large markets. Although their study 
deals with emerging markets, a similar argument could be extended to all countries. Chan, 
Hameed and Kang (2013) elaborate on the liquidity association with systematic volatility and 
beta; but this explanation is different from equating high R2 with low information efficiency 
and low R2 with high information efficiency. 
Another is the investor sentiment reason of Hou, Peng and Xiong (2013). Retail investors tend 
to over-react to information in smaller capitalization markets. Small capitalization markets 
attract more sentiment driven activities that cause strong medium-term price momentum that 
are uncorrelated across stocks. Therefore, small capitalization markets are likely to have low 
stock return R2. This explanation is, however, opposite to equating high R2 with low 
information efficiency and low R2 with high information efficiency.  
Yet, another possible explanation that is related to the information efficiency, but related to 
corporate structure and industry integration, which have been investigated in the extant and 
ongoing research, but with inconclusive outcomes. For example, Khanna and Thomas (2009), 
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in an empirical study of Chile that uses a unique data set, posit that synchronicity is strongly 
correlated with interlocking directorates. The presence of joint directors could be associated 
with either reduced firm-level transparency or increased correlation in firm fundamentals, such 
as joint resource allocation across firms.  
We further extend this type of argument to industry integrations. For developing countries, 
increased firm capitalizations may lead to more investments in vertical and horizontal 
integrations, and thus increased R2’s, since listed firm’s stock prices are more tightly knitted. 
For developed countries, increased firm capitalizations, however, lead to more diversity and 
horizontal competition of industries. This would reduce R2’s, since firms are more diversified. 
Stuckey and White (1993) suggest integration is another impetus in a market, when it is young 
and less developed. Developed countries typically have anti-trust laws to prevent large firms 
from pursuing too much vertical integration. Firms in well-developed markets do not find it 
advantageous, but find it too costly to integrate downstream. D’Aveni and Ilinitch (1992) 
postulate that firms in markets with a high degree of vertical integration have high systematic 
and credit risks. Thus, high integration is connected with the observation of high price 
synchronicity in developing countries. 
To explore the industry integration explanation, we find out more about the characteristics of 
the various decile portfolios in each of the 40 countries. For each decile portfolio, the time-
dependent average beta, ?̂?1,𝑖𝑗 ,  is computed for stock in each decile portfolio using Equation 
(1). The betas decrease more sharply for smaller sized firms in the developed countries. For 
developing countries, the betas of smaller firms (4th to 10th deciles) are more similar in values 
and do not fall as sharply as in the developed countries. We plot the sum of time-averaged 
estimated coefficients ?̂?1,𝑑𝑗 + ?̂?2,𝑑𝑗 in years 1995-2000, 2001-2006, and 2007-2012 versus the 
1st decile to the 10th decile in terms of firm capitalizations in each of 16 developed countries, 
as well as the developing group of countries in Figures 2a and 2b. 
[Insert Figures 2a, 2b here] 
The systematic risks including international influences of the US stock market are considered 
in the sum of time-averaged coefficients  ?̂?1,𝑑𝑗 + ?̂?2,𝑑𝑗  . Figure 2a shows that the market 
impacts on stock returns are the strongest for the largest stocks. The slope of the graph is 
negative. However, for Figure 2b, the developing countries show stylistically a much smaller 
slope. This means that the stocks relate to the market systematically in about the same way 
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regardless of firm size. We do not think the information reasons could be solely adequate in 
explaining such stylistic differences across international stock markets. 
5. Does Industry Integration Matter?  
5.1. Measuring Industry Integration 
For each country every year from 1995 to 2012, we compute the sample correlation of every 
pair of weekly returns of firms in each decile. We next average the sample correlations of all 
firms in the same decile per year per country. Table 6 shows that the average sample 
correlations decrease with firm size for all countries; and the average sample correlations are 
consistently larger in the developing countries than in the developed countries. Developing 
country firms in the lower deciles have markedly larger within-decile correlations than firms 
in the developed countries. More pronounced differences are observed in the lower deciles than 
in the higher deciles. Higher correlations contribute to a higher R2, hence, it is not surprising 
how developing firms in general have higher price synchronicity. There appear to be more 
diversification benefits in developed economies than developing economies. The 
diversification of returns appears to be more correlated with relative capitalization sizes and 
industry structures than the information models. We explore this further. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
It is difficult to find suitable variables in the literature to measure directly the effects of industry 
integration in country. Based on the pair-wise correlations, we propose a new industry 
integration index. For every year from 1995 to 2012, we compute the pair-wise correlations of 
weekly returns for all sample firms for each country. For firms in the three largest deciles, we 
multiply the numbers by the corresponding value weights to derive at the “Large Decile 
Correlation Index” (LDCI); and in the same way, we compute the average correlation index 
for the firms in the smallest three deciles, and derive the “Small Decile Correlation Index” 
(SDCI) for each country. The LDCI and SDCI numbers are organized according to correlations 
within industries and are value-weighted; and they are not the same as the decile correlation 
numbers in Table 6. We do not include the middle 4 deciles in each industry to avoid 
constructing a variable that is highly correlated with aggregate country ACAP each year or 
with IVOL. The middle industry deciles also tend to be similar across countries and may not 
provide as much variability.  
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From Table 7, it seems that many developing countries had higher LDCI as well as higher 
SDCI than developed countries. Amongst the developing countries, China, India, Malaysia, 
Turkey, and Thailand had some of the highest LDCI and SDCI. High indexes indicate 
concentration of industries with high linkages within the country. By 2000, developed countries, 
such as US, UK, Sweden, Austria, Canada, France, and Germany, have some of the smallest 
SDCI indicating that smaller capitalized firms in the developed countries operate in industries 
that have low within-industry correlations. High within-industry correlation is consistent with 
a high level of vertical and horizontal integration or inter-connectedness of firms within similar 
industries. Fan, Huang, Morck, and Yeung (2017) report that Chinese firms in the 2000’s are 
more vertically integrated than US firms previously. This could be due to the weaker legal 
structures and higher transaction costs in business-to-business dealings. Vertical integration 
can circumvent some of these costs. Barney (2002) argues that industry integration is practiced 
in many developing countries without clear anti-trust laws as a corporate strategy to gain 
competitive advantage. Examples are in Brazilian aluminum industry and other mining 
industries in South America. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Based on the correlation indices of the size-based decile portfolios, we compute two different 
measures for industry integration. The first composite index takes the averages of LDCI and 
SDCI, which is defined as [DMCI = (LDCI + SDCI)/2]; and the second index is computed as 
a range indicator, which takes the differences between the LDCI and SDCI, which is defined 
as [DSCI = (LDCI – SDCI)]. We use the two integration measures in this study to capture some 
aspects of this integration tendency. Industry organization structures and state of industrial and 
business market development are different according to the density of competitive firms in 
each country. However, there appears to be a general systematic divide between developed and 
developing countries.  
Based on the Fama-French’s 30 industry categories (Appendix 1), we compute the correlation 
indices for firms in each of the 30 industry sectors, and derive the largest sector-based 
correlation index, LICI, and the smallest sector-based correlation index, SICI. We also use the 
same methodology as in the decile-based indices to derive the two industry sector-based 
integration measures, which are denoted as [IMCI = (LICI + SICI]/2) and [ISCI = (LICI – 
SICI)], respectively.  
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5.2. Industry Integration Explanation for Price Synchronicity 
We next test if the industry integration indices could explain the price synchronicity issue by 
running various panel LERW and LEQW regressions on the key explanatory variables, which 
include GGI, IVOL, and LSCI, together with other control and structural variables. This 
regression specification with a sample size of 400 each year adds industry integration indices, 
including the decile-based indices, DMCIj and DSCIj, and the sector-based indices, IMCIj and 
ISCIj, as explanatory variables to (10). 
We run the 400 observations country-based panel regressions of stock price synchronicity 
following Equation (10) on economy variables across 40 countries and over 18 years from 1995 
to 2012. We then expand the number of observation to 7,200 by running the 10-decile, 40-
country and 18-year panel regressions. As an extension to the panel regressions in Table 5, we 
add additional explanatory variables, [DMCIj and IMCIj] and [DSCIj and ISCIj], separately to 
the models; and the results are reported in Tables 8(a) and 8(b), respectively. The adjusted R2 
shows that the goodness-of-fit increases across all the panel models relative to the models in 
Table5.  
[Insert Tables 8(a) and 8(b) here] 
We find that the coefficients on GGI, IVOL, and ACAP are consistent with those reported in 
Table 5; and the estimated coefficients on DMCIj (Columns 1 to 6) and IMCIj (Columns 7 and 
8) are significantly positive at less than 1% level in all the panel models. DMCI and IMCI 
explain incrementally cross-sectional variations in price synchronicity, which are not correlated 
with property rights, information opaqueness and market size factors. The performance is 
slightly better in the LEQR models than in the LERW models; and the range-based industry 
integration indices, DSCIj and ISCIj, explain more variations in the price synchronicity in the 
models relative to the medium-based industry integration indices, DMCIj and IMCIj.  Like in 
Table 5, GGI and IVOL are only significant in the country-panel models (Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 8(a) and (b)), in explaining international disparity in LERW and LEQR on at the cross-
country level. The effects of (negative) weak property right and (positive) information 
opaqueness are explained away by the industry integration indices and the average market size 
factors, ACAP, at both the decile and industry panel regressions (Columns 3 to 8). The market 
size variable is consistently positive across the models, but the size factor is not correlated with 
industry structure at the firm and industry within the countries.  
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We offer an alternative and complementary reason of why the R2 disparity occurs 
internationally by suggesting a non-information explanation that is related to corporate and 
industry structures of integrations. Our industry integration indices are apparently less coarse 
than the Herfindahl indices (measuring market / industry concentration), and thus enables us 
to capture the effects of industry compositions and intra-industry firm correlations. By using 
different ways to represent the pair-wise return correlations of firms in the largest-decile and 
the smallest-deciles, and in largest-sectors and the smallest-sectors by industry, the proposed 
indices capture vertical and horizontal integrations within the country and industry, which are 
not captured by the MYY”s hypothesis of property right factor that is significant only at the 
cross-country level. At within-the-country level, what matter most in explaining price 
synchronicity within-the-country is the industry composition and integration.  
5.3. Robustness Tests 
For robustness checks, we run the panel regressions on (9) to test interactions between the 
industry integration and GGI, and summarize he results in Table 9. The results show that all 
the coefficients on the industry integration indices and the market size variables are 
significantly positive; and the GGI coefficients are only statistically significant in the sector-
based panel models with a positive sign (Columns 5 to 8). The market opaqueness coefficients, 
IVOL, are insignificant in all the models. The results imply that stock returns are highly 
synchronous in markets where firms are highly inter-dependent in their business and industry 
interactions, and the business and industry integration effects are reinforced by strong property 
right protection. The results show that in countries where industry integrations and property 
right protection are strong, firms’ stock prices move more synchronously relative to countries 
with low property right protection and lack of horizontal and vertical integration among firms. 
In other words, the within-the-country variations in stock price R2 increases when the industry 
structure is more highly inter-dependent and the property right protection is stronger. 
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
We next use a “GFC2008” year dummy to represent the post-global financial crisis shocks on 
the industry integration structure in the sample countries. The dummy “GFC2008” has a value 
of 1 for the period after 2008; and 0 otherwise. We interact the dummy with the industry 
integration indices, both decile-based and sector-based indices, in the panel regression models 
controlling for GGI, IVOL and ACAP together with other control variables. The results are 
summarized in Table 10. We find that the industry integration indices, (DMCIj and DSCIj) and 
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(IMCIj and ISCIj), are significantly positive in explaining the price synchronicity at both the 
decile-country (Columns 1 to 4) and sector-country (Columns 5 to 8) models. However, the 
interactive terms, (“GFC2008×gMCI” and “GFC2008×gSCI”), where [g = (D, I)], are 
insignificant. The results imply that the effects of industry integration are not subject to the 
transitory shocks. The coefficients on GGI, IVOL and ACAP are consistent with the results of 
the panel regression models in Tables 8(a) and 8(b).  
 [Insert Table 10 here] 
In the early panel models, we use the value-weighted aggregate correlation indices at the 
country level. We next derive the average country-decile, DACId,j, and the average country-
sector correction indices, IACIs,j, where the subscript “d,j” and “s,j’ denote the decile-country-
based and sector-country-based averaged indices, respectively; and use the indices to proxy the 
level of industry integrations in the decile-country and sector-country panel models. The results 
in Table 11 again affirm that the industry integrations, both the decile-country and sector-
country indices, significantly increase the price synchronicity. The decile and sector-
adjustments of the indices are uncorrelated with the market capitalization effects, and the 
ACAP coefficients are still positive and statistically significant in all the models; and GGI 
coefficients, are significant only in the industry sector-country panel, which is consistent with 
the early results.  
 [Insert Table 11 here] 
The last robustness tests involve further disaggregation of the decile-country to firm-country 
level, and the sample size is expanded significantly from 7,200 observations to 475,701 firm-
country-year observations. We re-estimate the panel regression models by clustering the errors 
at the country, sector and year levels, and the results are shown in Table 12. We find the 
industry integration indices are all significant and have positive effects on the price 
synchronicity in all the models, regardless whether we use the aggregate country-level indices, 
(DMCIj, DSCIj), and/or the average decile-country-level indices, (DACId,j), and the average 
sector-country-level indices, (IACIsj). The market size, ACAP, and the property right 
protection, GGI, coefficients are also significant and positive; but the IVOL coefficients are 
statistically insignificant in all the models. The results show that industry integration is a robust 
and significant factors that could explain disparity in the price synchronicity within the country, 
and the effects are uncorrelated with market size and GGI of the countries. Therefore, our 
results in all levels: the country-level, decile-level, sector-level and firm-level, are consistent 
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and all point to the fact that high integration in industry structure, both horizontally and 
vertically, where firm prices are highly correlated, could have positive effects on the within-
the-country stock return synchronicity. The industry integration story offers an alternative 
explanation to the price synchronicity story of MYY, which is not based on the information 
hypothesis.  
[Insert Table 12 here] 
6. Conclusions 
Since the seminal study by MYY (2000), the information efficiency story has been widely 
accepted in explaining differing stock price synchronicity across countries. MYY explain that 
in countries with poor government’s protection of private property rights, as represented by 
GGI, risk arbitraging activities are unattractive and infeasible, because inter-corporation 
shifting of income is widespread, which reduces incentives of investors to expend efforts in 
extracting firm-specific information. Therefore, we expect more investors in low GGI markets 
to trade on market-wide information, which increases price synchronicity in the markets. MYY 
supports the information hypothesis when they found a negative relationship between 
aggregate country-level stock price synchronicity and GGI, and the GGI explanatory effect is 
independent of those from other structural economic factors. Jin and Myers (2006) argue that 
the negative stock return R2 and GGI relationship is only valid in an opaque market, where 
information asymmetry exists. Chan and Hameed (2006) relying on MYY’s information 
hypothesis show that in low GGI countries, greater security analyst coverage is correlated with 
high stock price synchronicity. They postulate that security analysts generate more market-
wide information than firm-specific information, which as a result, reduce variations in stock 
prices.  
However, the information hypothesis (not the disparity in international R2) has been challenged 
in recent years by several studies. Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) argue that market 
transparency reduces the information inefficiency, such that time-variant information of firms 
is processed prior to the occurrence of events, which will not thus reduce price synchronicity 
in the market. Hou, Peng and Xiong (2013) find that there is no definitive theoretical 
construction to suggest that if rational investors receive more firm-specific information, they 
generate more idiosyncratic return variance. Therefore, they reject the price synchronicity and 
information efficiency relationship. They also show that if investors are sentiment driven, 
information inefficiency is captured by the serial correlation stock returns resulting in strong 
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momentum in medium-term stock prices and low R2 in stock returns. Both of these findings 
are at odds with use of the information hypothesis in explaining the disparity in international 
R2. Other studies such as Ashbaugh-Skaife, Gassen, and LaFond (2005) and Pantzalis and Xu 
(2008) also refute the association of stock price synchronicity with stock price informativeness. 
Our study aims to add to the understanding of price synchronicity by relooking at the good 
government index puzzle in explaining stock return R2. We ask the question if the negative 
price synchronicity and GGI relationship could be explained by other factors that are not related 
to MYY’s information hypothesis or information theorizing in general. We replicate the 
empirical analyses of MYY (2000) using sample firms from the same 40 countries, but extend 
over a longer period from 1995- 2012. We find that GGI is consistently significant and negative 
for all periods except 2010 and 2011. The explanatory effects of GGI appear to become less 
effective after the global financial crisis. We also find that country market index volatility, like 
GGI, is a significant explanatory variable for the cross-sectional country-level regressions. For 
robustness checking of the results, we employ corrections for heteroskedasticity as well as 
using an alternative measure of equal-weighted than just error-weighted R2.   
However, by disaggregating into size deciles of firms within each country and the R2’s of these 
portfolios of firms, and employing panel regressions, we are able to discover new findings 
explaining variation of R2’s within country and also variations of R2’s across countries. GGI 
becomes insignificant in explaining these variations. We verify this result by varying the 
control and structural variables for robustness checking. It is found that market size (ACAP), 
and industry structure variables in different countries could significantly impact price 
synchronicity in a differential way across countries. Clearly smaller (capitalization) firms in all 
countries have smaller contributions to a country’s weighted R2 compared with the larger firms 
in the same country. This does not support the information hypothesis. The result does not 
necessarily have to do with whether the market is informationally efficient or less so. The result 
of having smaller R2 for smaller firms that may be deemed to be less informationally efficient 
is, however, consistent with Hou, Peng and Xiong’s (2013) conjecture that investors in large 
markets are less sentiment driven compared to the investors in small markets, which are more 
likely to over-react to information. However, we also show that systematic risk and loadings 
are also associated with the firm size effects at the same time. The systematic risk may not be 
related to any informational or sentiment story. 
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The differential nature of the correlation structures and beta coefficients in developing 
countries versus developed countries points to other factors explaining the issue of the disparity 
in international R2’s across countries. We derive the correlation indices using stock prices, and 
compute the value-weighted indices at the country level to proxy the level of industry 
integration of the sample countries. When we include the industry integration variable in our 
panel regression, we find that the industry integration variables are statistically significant in 
explaining stock return synchronicity at the decile-country and sector-country panel models. 
We also find that the inclusion of the industry integration variable does not explain away the 
effects of market size in the models, but good government index, GGI and stock market 
volatility, IVOL, variables become insignificant in the models. GGI is significant, but has a 
positive sign in the sector-country panel models. The results offer an alternative explanation to 
the international disparity in R2 puzzle, which is not related to information hypothesis. We find 
that stork prices of firms in countries that have highly inter-dependent structure tend to be more 
synchronous than firms in countries where the industry is less structured and weakly integrated.  
Firms in economies that are generally more inter-connected and inter-dependent grow in size 
with more vertical and horizontal integrations. Thus, R2 will generally be higher in these 
relatively less developed economies, after accounting for capitalization size. In the developed 
economies, most firms will grow with some degree of diversity and horizontal expansions 
globally, so capitalizations will contribute negatively to a decrease in aggregate country R2. 
Averaging across all R2’s in an economy will produce the disparity in R2’s across countries. 
The explanatory effects of the industry integration indices are robust to withhold a battery of 
diagnostic tests, and they are consistently significant and positive in all the models in 
explaining the within-the-country R2 variations.  
The above explanation of the disparity in R2’s does not require any argument whether the stock 
market is informationally efficient or less informationally efficient given financial analysts’ 
report and research as long as there is some price impact. It also does not need to assume that 
if the analysts in the less developed countries report more of macroeconomic news and less of 
firm-specific news. Reporting of macroeconomic news will drive more of the larger firm stocks 
than the smaller firm stocks, resulting in higher country R2. Reporting of firm-specific news on 
both large and small firms will still drive a higher country R2 since movement of a single large 
firm will influence movements of other big stocks in the economy. Thus, as long as news has 
impact on prices, and as long as news coverage occurs on all stocks though perhaps with higher 
frequency on the bigger stocks, the subtle capitalization effects in our study via disaggregated 
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measures of price synchronicity could explain the international disparity in stock price 
synchronicity. The capital inter-connectedness and relation to industry structures argument we 
provide of course does not necessarily replace the explanation via property rights. The 
proprietary right explanation in our study, however, remains robust when considering R2 at the 
country level, and also disaggregated firm level. However, our study shows that this property 
right effect can be strongly supplemented with local market volatility effect as well as the 
industry structure effect. 
There are interesting implications when we extend our considerations of such R2 disparity 
issues to industry and market structures beyond the arguments of information dissemination 
channels and the information hypothesis. The size effect we document and similarly studied 
elsewhere in other contexts points to important recommendations for international portfolio 
management. Similarly, the industry effects we suggest should also be a key consideration of 
international portfolio management. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
The table shows the statistics of mean and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the variables used in our study. The statistics are computed year-by-year for all 40 
countries, for the periods 1995-2012.  
 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ERW 0.120 0.089 0.123 0.141 0.101 0.102 0.123 0.111 0.098 0.085 0.081 0.097 0.123 0.173 0.139 0.117 0.144 0.090  
(0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
EQW 0.125 0.100 0.129 0.138 0.100 0.098 0.123 0.116 0.109 0.099 0.092 0.107 0.135 0.164 0.134 0.135 0.163 0.101  
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
GDP 9.075 9.123 9.101 9.024 9.031 9.037 9.013 9.078 9.228 9.373 9.469 9.560 9.706 9.793 9.707 9.805 9.903 9.895  
(1.29) (1.26) (1.25) (1.32) (1.33) (1.29) (1.29) (1.30) (1.32) (1.31) (1.28) (1.24) (1.22) (1.19) (1.16) (1.10) (1.08) (1.06) 
NSTK 5.592 5.660 5.711 5.767 5.790 5.836 5.815 5.786 5.797 5.790 5.790 5.777 5.788 5.819 5.796 5.826 5.845 5.871  
(0.92) (0.97) (0.90) (0.90) (0.93) (0.97) (0.99) (1.08) (1.12) (1.13) (1.21) (1.26) (1.27) (1.27) (1.28) (1.32) (1.37) (1.39) 
GEO 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728 12.728  
(2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.09) 
VGDP 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IHHI 0.169 0.165 0.159 0.158 0.153 0.151 0.156 0.145 0.143 0.143 0.144 0.150 0.162 0.167 0.160 0.158 0.157 0.164  
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
FHHI 0.049 0.053 0.047 0.046 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.039 0.040 0.050 0.051 0.057 0.058 0.062 0.054 0.055 0.058 0.060  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ECI 0.348 0.369 0.319 0.322 0.332 0.264 0.235 0.274 0.286 0.279 0.273 0.295 0.256 0.252 0.275 0.257 0.252 0.253  
(0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
GGI 13.363 13.544 13.321 13.005 13.705 13.089 13.485 13.546 12.984 12.990 13.274 13.143 12.633 12.948 12.843 12.934 13.001 13.197  
(4.01) (3.98) (4.34) (4.18) (3.82) (4.29) (3.94) (4.00) (4.29) (4.51) (4.41) (4.38) (4.70) (4.29) (4.36) (4.42) (4.50) (4.12) 
ACAP 22.323 22.463 22.137 22.191 22.355 22.256 22.036 22.068 22.179 22.351 22.429 22.670 22.936 22.287 22.521 22.616 22.632 22.841  
(1.92) (1.89) (1.90) (2.04) (2.03) (1.98) (1.93) (1.81) (1.89) (1.85) (1.78) (1.85) (1.61) (1.69) (1.41) (1.82) (1.58) (1.45) 
IVOL 1.426 1.155 1.840 2.495 1.828 1.901 1.823 1.804 1.422 1.134 1.086 1.254 1.526 2.680 1.832 1.349 1.753 1.100 
  (0.81) (0.52) (0.79) (0.94) (0.61) (0.73) (0.63) (0.60) (0.44) (0.38) (0.40) (0.42) (0.42) (0.53) (0.38) (0.32) (0.38) (0.39) 
 
Table 2a: Trends in ERW R2, EQW R2 and GDP 
 
The table shows the values of the ERW, EQW R2’s and GDP of the 40 countries in years 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. GDP is 
measured as the log of per capita GDP in US$.  
 
  1995     2000     2005     2010     
ERW EQW GDP ERW EQW GDP ERW EQW GDP ERW EQW GDP 
A)      Developed Countries 
Australia 0.078 0.054 10.310 0.043 0.045 9.940 0.035 0.058 10.479 0.159 0.109 10.937 
Austria 0.041 0.091 9.945 0.039 0.062 10.088 0.045 0.066 10.523 0.077 0.159 10.721 
Belgium 0.071 0.108 10.244 0.069 0.078 10.034 0.031 0.072 10.496 0.062 0.153 10.683 
Canada 0.042 0.044 9.932 0.041 0.038 10.091 0.040 0.039 10.495 0.038 0.042 10.767 
Denmark 0.052 0.047 10.460 0.036 0.045 10.310 0.043 0.060 10.771 0.101 0.113 10.943 
Finland 0.087 0.111 10.150 0.117 0.083 10.068 0.069 0.082 10.527 0.240 0.218 10.695 
France 0.069 0.087 10.212 0.093 0.074 10.026 0.049 0.085 10.466 0.116 0.157 10.620 
Germany 0.069 0.094 10.339 0.084 0.066 10.044 0.044 0.066 10.422 0.054 0.122 10.609 
Greece 0.116 0.130 10.208 0.247 0.240 9.341 0.060 0.079 9.981 0.153 0.157 10.160 
Holland 0.047 0.103 9.422 0.069 0.068 10.093 0.048 0.109 10.057 0.070 0.202 10.746 
Hong Kong 0.109 0.119 10.058 0.093 0.099 10.15 0.047 0.068 10.187 0.124 0.144 10.387 
Ireland 0.039 0.066 9.845 0.027 0.056 10.158 0.087 0.099 10.802 0.170 0.13 10.727 
Italy 0.158 0.159 9.899 0.142 0.109 9.876 0.055 0.100 10.329 0.195 0.226 10.438 
Japan 0.179 0.174 10.658 0.100 0.086 10.527 0.096 0.110 10.485 0.183 0.184 10.667 
Korea 0.151 0.132 9.374 0.121 0.117 9.337 0.095 0.120 9.773 0.075 0.098 9.930 
N. Zealand 0.039 0.039 10.436 0.041 0.038 9.509 0.049 0.057 10.223 0.059 0.081 10.398 
Norway 0.055 0.054 6.396 0.054 0.045 10.531 0.040 0.042 11.094 0.072 0.071 11.364 
Portugal 0.036 0.057 7.656 0.056 0.075 9.348 0.021 0.075 9.808 0.073 0.176 9.970 
Singapore 0.072 0.114 10.074 0.102 0.103 10.034 0.046 0.057 10.258 0.056 0.125 10.708 
Spain 0.123 0.151 9.626 0.091 0.069 9.579 0.085 0.126 10.170 0.239 0.226 10.316 
Sweden 0.039 0.036 10.266 0.083 0.078 10.235 0.033 0.042 10.619 0.093 0.107 10.802 
S. Africa 0.033 0.038 8.212 0.043 0.050 8.012 0.037 0.047 8.563 0.041 0.044 8.891 
UK 0.061 0.073 9.912 0.069 0.058 10.131 0.059 0.083 10.55 0.115 0.134 10.503 
US 0.018 0.02 10.234 0.022 0.027 10.47 0.021 0.033 10.66 0.037 0.049 10.754 
B)      Developing Countries 
Brazil 0.041 0.089 8.467 0.048 0.079 8.214 0.078 0.087 8.464 0.056 0.106 9.305 
Chile 0.040 0.107 8.556 0.081 0.081 8.530 0.036 0.081 8.931 0.042 0.082 9.450 
China 0.433 0.435 6.399 0.260 0.256 6.852 0.246 0.248 7.454 0.216 0.211 8.394 
Columbia 0.165 0.075 7.987 0.210 0.074 7.816 0.171 0.107 8.137 0.186 0.126 8.742 
Czech 0.078 0.090 8.629 0.059 0.056 8.652 0.154 0.076 9.451 0.120 0.120 9.849 
India 0.143 0.160 5.970 0.098 0.086 6.142 0.162 0.213 6.589 0.215 0.218 7.213 
Indonesia 0.082 0.098 6.945 0.112 0.129 6.685 0.109 0.119 7.163 0.083 0.104 8.002 
Malaysia 0.242 0.233 8.365 0.196 0.199 8.292 0.097 0.098 8.598 0.063 0.087 9.063 
Mexico 0.137 0.125 9.725 0.122 0.098 8.804 0.068 0.103 8.969 0.084 0.101 9.092 
Pakistan 0.121 0.121 7.742 0.077 0.097 6.243 0.079 0.098 6.541 0.049 0.104 6.932 
Peru 0.265 0.154 7.090 0.150 0.047 7.625 0.228 0.080 7.960 0.251 0.093 8.592 
Philippines 0.188 0.128 8.190 0.099 0.101 6.950 0.189 0.116 7.091 0.131 0.108 7.667 
Poland 0.329 0.319 9.360 0.098 0.089 8.402 0.065 0.081 8.983 0.137 0.159 9.418 
Taiwan 0.341 0.342 9.462 0.165 0.299 9.592 0.108 0.108 9.682 0.175 0.196 9.825 
Thailand 0.202 0.198 7.947 0.133 0.141 7.593 0.097 0.112 7.946 0.109 0.127 8.516 
Turkey 0.193 0.231 8.284 0.269 0.275 8.013 0.100 0.181 8.341 0.160 0.225 8.891 
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Table 2b: Trends in NSTK, GEO, and VGDP 
 
The table shows the values of log of number of listed stocks, log of geographical area in square kilometers, and variance of 
GDP of the 40 countries in years 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. 
 
  1995      2000      2005      2010       
  NSTK GEO VGDP% NSTK GEO VGDP% NSTK GEO VGDP% NSTK GEO VGDP%  
A)      Developed Country 
Australia 6.653 15.854 0.000 7.107 15.854 0.004 7.204 15.854 0.014 7.608 15.854 0.096 
Austria 4.369 11.320 0.000 4.205 11.320 0.002 4.220 11.320 0.008 4.127 11.320 0.008 
Belgium 4.727 10.326 0.000 4.970 10.326 0.010 5.288 10.326 0.019 4.920 10.326 0.053 
Canada 6.899 16.023 0.001 7.332 16.023 0.022 7.607 16.023 0.019 7.977 16.023 0.057 
Denmark 4.625 10.656 0.000 4.883 10.656 0.002 5.081 10.656 0.019 5.170 10.656 0.131 
Finland 4.143 12.627 0.001 4.970 12.627 0.012 4.820 12.627 0.024 4.727 12.627 0.314 
France 5.642 13.213 0.000 6.405 13.213 0.009 6.774 13.213 0.014 6.792 13.213 0.056 
Germany 5.714 12.763 0.001 6.714 12.763 0.002 6.458 12.763 0.018 6.330 12.763 0.124 
Greece 5.308 11.767 0.000 5.765 11.767 0.192 5.694 11.767 0.133 5.624 11.767 0.180 
Holland 5.333 10.427 0.000 5.412 10.427 0.005 5.425 10.427 0.008 4.635 10.427 0.113 
Hong Kong 6.016 6.957 0.000 6.426 6.957 0.030 6.781 6.957 0.041 7.030 6.957 0.059 
Ireland 4.248 11.140 0.000 4.190 11.140 0.005 3.761 11.140 0.021 3.689 11.140 0.098 
Italy 4.682 12.592 0.001 5.425 12.592 0.035 5.580 12.592 0.010 5.638 12.592 0.102 
Japan 7.115 12.807 0.000 7.261 12.807 0.454 7.418 12.807 0.055 7.514 12.807 0.043 
Korea 6.040 11.699 0.000 6.254 11.699 0.519 6.613 11.699 0.095 6.804 11.699 0.102 
N. Zealand 4.820 12.481 0.001 4.883 12.481 0.021 4.970 12.481 0.009 4.898 12.481 0.047 
Norway 4.949 12.808 0.000 5.198 12.808 0.022 5.198 12.808 0.015 5.220 12.808 0.036 
Portugal 4.890 11.424 0.001 4.290 11.424 0.003 2.485 11.424 0.031 2.398 11.424 0.040 
Singapore 5.170 6.507 0.000 5.945 6.507 0.190 6.475 6.507 0.180 6.052 6.507 0.197 
Spain 5.886 13.121 0.000 5.784 13.121 0.011 6.105 13.121 0.008 6.184 13.121 0.107 
Sweden 5.231 12.925 0.001 5.545 12.925 0.015 5.375 12.925 0.018 5.687 12.925 0.150 
S. Africa 6.404 14.009 0.000 6.363 14.009 0.019 5.864 14.009 0.006 5.781 14.009 0.092 
UK 7.417 12.396 0.001 7.687 12.396 0.001 7.558 12.396 0.006 7.197 12.396 0.103 
US 7.695 16.030 0.000 8.036 16.030 0.008 8.101 16.030 0.015 8.287 16.030 0.066 
B)      Developing Country 
Brazil 6.240 15.939 0.002 6.061 15.939 0.037 5.878 15.939 0.039 5.855 15.939 0.061 
Chile 5.429 13.519 0.001 5.308 13.519 0.189 5.242 13.519 0.020 5.142 13.519 0.068 
China 5.572 16.055 0.002 6.933 16.055 0.020 7.191 16.055 0.007 7.602 16.055 0.044 
Columbia 5.159 13.919 0.000 4.700 13.919 0.128 4.585 13.919 0.022 4.220 13.919 0.049 
Czech 7.362 11.255 0.003 4.710 11.255 0.093 2.773 11.255 0.010 2.773 11.255 0.230 
India 7.328 14.905 0.000 7.631 14.905 0.775 6.788 14.905 0.003 7.013 14.905 0.004 
Indonesia 5.308 14.410 0.001 5.635 14.410 0.017 5.784 14.410 0.073 6.016 14.410 0.223 
Malaysia 5.753 12.702 0.000 6.213 12.702 0.270 6.586 12.702 0.076 6.752 12.702 0.187 
Mexico 5.165 14.480 0.000 5.130 14.480 0.004 4.949 14.480 0.025 4.787 14.480 0.091 
Pakistan 5.394 13.555 0.000 6.138 13.555 0.028 6.205 13.555 0.041 6.240 13.555 0.056 
Peru 5.313 14.062 0.004 5.187 14.062 0.156 5.106 14.062 0.040 5.159 14.062 0.124 
Philippines 5.130 12.605 0.000 5.257 12.605 0.066 5.293 12.605 0.021 5.371 12.605 0.041 
Poland 4.078 12.632 0.002 5.242 12.632 0.013 5.357 12.632 0.033 6.279 12.632 0.044 
Taiwan 5.303 10.497 0.000 6.370 10.497 0.034 6.989 10.497 0.100 7.256 10.497 0.109 
Thailand 6.033 13.144 0.000 6.246 13.144 0.601 6.418 13.144 0.036 6.590 13.144 0.100 
Turkey 5.130 13.554 0.003 5.631 13.554 0.239 5.583 13.554 0.340 5.707 13.554 0.284 
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Table 2c: Trends in IHHI, FHHI, and ECI 
 
The table shows the values of the Industry Herfindahl index (IHHI), the firm Herfindahl index (FHHI), and the earnings co-
movement index of the 40 countries in years 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. 
 
  1995     2000   2005     2010     
IHHI FHHI ECI IHHI FHHI ECI IHHI FHHI ECI IHHI FHHI ECI 
A)      Developed Countries 
Australia 0.168 0.036 0.263 0.160 0.031 0.181 0.159 0.028 0.250 0.159 0.029 0.215 
Austria 0.136 0.045 0.261 0.097 0.034 0.121 0.103 0.030 0.257 0.118 0.031 0.261 
Belgium 0.151 0.040 0.439 0.326 0.043 0.383 0.176 0.053 0.176 0.117 0.037 0.234 
Canada 0.093 0.024 0.298 0.081 0.019 0.280 0.078 0.015 0.201 0.074 0.013 0.250 
Denmark 0.116 0.030 0.050 0.109 0.031 0.671 0.258 0.080 0.141 0.307 0.085 0.400 
Finland 0.228 0.025 0.511 0.382 0.033 0.179 0.326 0.029 0.189 0.342 0.033 0.252 
France 0.078 0.009 0.216 0.085 0.011 0.158 0.073 0.010 0.327 0.075 0.010 0.146 
Germany 0.090 0.017 0.141 0.079 0.016 0.240 0.072 0.013 0.264 0.063 0.012 0.262 
Greece 0.147 0.070 0.360 0.130 0.073 0.362 0.238 0.214 0.269 0.158 0.134 0.227 
Holland 0.298 0.081 0.296 0.195 0.026 0.161 0.125 0.021 0.312 0.165 0.021 0.353 
Hong Kong 0.104 0.029 0.339 0.162 0.046 0.234 0.130 0.023 0.167 0.125 0.014 0.186 
Ireland 0.108 0.026 0.424 0.115 0.021 0.127 0.125 0.019 0.401 0.116 0.018 0.311 
Italy 0.053 0.007 0.495 0.051 0.007 0.311 0.051 0.006 0.375 0.048 0.005 0.350 
Japan 0.100 0.039 0.442 0.070 0.029 0.208 0.066 0.023 0.275 0.063 0.020 0.327 
Korea 0.100 0.022 0.556 0.087 0.016 0.238 0.067 0.025 0.334 0.062 0.025 0.296 
N. Zealand 0.295 0.118 0.450 0.217 0.034 0.099 0.172 0.057 0.442 0.140 0.051 0.278 
Norway 0.140 0.121 0.572 0.174 0.072 0.410 0.162 0.122 0.317 0.182 0.132 0.113 
Portugal 0.372 0.048 0.095 0.266 0.042 0.192 0.222 0.043 0.375 0.240 0.044 0.453 
Singapore 0.114 0.035 0.441 0.086 0.033 0.238 0.183 0.085 0.314 0.758 0.230 0.284 
Spain 0.158 0.023 0.665 0.166 0.027 0.403 0.144 0.023 0.261 0.128 0.021 0.370 
Sweden 0.152 0.026 0.129 0.133 0.024 0.293 0.105 0.017 0.266 0.098 0.016 0.369 
S. Africa 0.104 0.081 0.241 0.101 0.037 0.280 0.189 0.038 0.208 0.241 0.030 0.173 
UK 0.096 0.033 0.260 0.107 0.033 0.240 0.108 0.032 0.273 0.110 0.029 0.226 
US 0.044 0.008 0.318 0.040 0.006 0.310 0.043 0.005 0.189 0.043 0.005 0.194 
        B)      Developing Countries 
Brazil 0.125 0.073 0.292 0.103 0.047 0.101 0.135 0.043 0.264 0.237 0.034 0.268 
Chile 0.108 0.047 0.309 0.101 0.031 0.217 0.090 0.029 0.275 0.098 0.027 0.278 
China 0.326 0.131 0.494 0.162 0.078 0.158 0.111 0.041 0.347 0.107 0.032 0.225 
Columbia 0.228 0.090 0.726 0.235 0.063 0.293 0.161 0.053 0.223 0.174 0.091 0.178 
Czech 0.348 0.000 0.148 0.209 0.190 0.069 0.251 0.211 0.100 0.298 0.251 0.099 
India 0.094 0.108 0.440 0.108 0.095 0.224 0.093 0.088 0.346 0.080 0.083 0.234 
Indonesia 0.280 0.058 0.489 0.240 0.048 0.498 0.147 0.042 0.318 0.162 0.048 0.216 
Malaysia 0.149 0.025 0.211 0.131 0.068 0.145 0.130 0.108 0.204 0.130 0.101 0.199 
Mexico 0.190 0.040 0.510 0.190 0.043 0.255 0.192 0.053 0.212 0.130 0.037 0.214 
Pakistan 0.228 0.119 0.582 0.116 0.045 0.176 0.122 0.030 0.324 0.152 0.034 0.190 
Peru 0.194 0.079 0.390 0.120 0.039 0.306 0.097 0.020 0.320 0.095 0.021 0.358 
Philippines 0.107 0.048 0.202 0.118 0.045 0.294 0.125 0.047 0.149 0.101 0.033 0.149 
Poland 0.512 0.000 0.167 0.387 0.060 0.254 0.318 0.054 0.360 0.187 0.052 0.372 
Taiwan 0.096 0.019 0.301 0.146 0.041 0.466 0.163 0.041 0.291 0.202 0.051 0.303 
Thailand 0.168 0.020 0.195 0.113 0.057 0.366 0.079 0.059 0.341 0.084 0.071 0.215 
Turkey 0.173 0.101 0.202 0.141 0.036 0.421 0.164 0.122 0.244 0.148 0.179 0.260 
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Table 2d: Trends in GGI, ACAP, and IVOL 
 
The table shows the values of the good government index (GGI), the log of average US$ capitalization (ACAP) per firm, 
and market index weekly return volatility (IVOL) in % of the 40 countries in years 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. 
 
  1995     2000     2005     2010     
GGI ACAP IVOL GGI ACAP IVOL GGI ACAP IVOL GGI ACAP IVOL 
A)      Developed Countries 
Australia 16.460 22.108 0.760 17.600 20.766 0.980 18.100 21.607 0.750 17.230 21.637 1.190 
Austria 18.130 23.460 1.120 17.000 23.270 1.160 18.030 23.568 1.100 18.000 23.477 1.850 
Belgium 16.180 23.762 0.750 15.430 23.355 1.410 15.400 23.378 0.650 16.430 23.360 1.440 
Canada 18.200 21.880 0.650 18.530 22.350 2.140 17.730 21.391 0.810 18.230 21.161 0.940 
Denmark 18.650 23.805 0.890 19.100 24.730 1.850 18.830 24.134 0.880 18.630 24.091 1.260 
Finland 18.450 23.381 1.850 19.330 23.856 3.790 18.930 23.250 0.990 18.530 23.202 1.410 
France 13.670 24.105 1.030 13.400 23.556 1.520 15.500 23.298 0.700 13.470 23.124 1.600 
Germany 17.470 23.631 1.040 16.900 23.252 1.530 17.530 22.943 0.860 17.230 22.707 1.270 
Greece 14.410 21.650 0.580 13.400 22.275 1.080 14.400 21.752 0.740 11.250 21.048 1.460 
Holland 16.060 23.136 1.240 13.400 23.332 2.390 14.400 22.663 0.990 11.250 25.036 2.260 
Hong Kong 16.450 24.657 1.470 17.030 25.344 2.230 17.630 24.849 0.790 17.730 24.756 1.210 
Ireland 12.320 23.054 0.650 13.900 23.665 1.240 13.330 24.574 0.980 13.230 23.439 1.680 
Italy 13.390 24.768 1.300 13.070 25.219 1.420 11.970 24.134 0.760 14.470 23.214 1.690 
Japan 14.610 23.599 1.710 11.470 22.980 1.660 13.100 22.700 0.960 11.070 22.250 1.310 
Korea 14.950 22.456 1.520 14.330 21.548 2.340 15.170 22.354 1.210 16.170 23.637 1.400 
N. Zealand 18.880 22.520 0.680 18.730 21.336 1.330 19.600 20.497 0.800 18.630 26.909 1.440 
Norway 17.940 21.736 0.840 18.430 19.917 1.280 18.230 19.644 1.990 17.930 19.052 1.280 
Portugal 12.240 21.809 0.650 10.800 22.313 1.530 12.070 24.776 0.640 11.970 25.640 1.670 
Singapore 14.890 23.752 0.740 15.730 22.477 1.960 15.830 22.285 0.770 15.330 22.403 0.950 
Spain 10.960 24.336 0.960 10.670 24.961 1.510 11.670 24.448 0.700 12.070 24.566 2.100 
Sweden 17.740 24.523 1.220 18.800 24.178 2.100 18.400 23.916 1.310 18.400 23.731 1.030 
S. Africa 8.290 20.884 1.010 8.190 20.703 1.460 12.400 21.101 1.480 8.310 22.064 1.090 
UK 17.900 22.663 0.590 18.000 22.985 1.200 17.300 23.250 0.630 16.930 23.011 1.270 
US 17.120 23.547 0.550 17.100 23.492 1.460 18.270 23.269 0.650 16.430 22.983 1.250 
B)      Developing Countries 
Brazil 10.720 22.889 3.400 12.640 22.836 2.430 12.320 23.813 1.720 12.320 24.235 1.430 
Chile 17.270 21.946 1.710 13.730 22.095 1.520 16.970 22.738 0.800 16.530 22.993 0.840 
China 3.490 22.213 3.590 4.430 22.607 1.640 3.200 22.041 1.480 4.830 23.333 1.560 
Columbia 7.440 15.428 0.910 4.530 15.151 1.100 8.000 15.592 1.370 4.830 17.593 1.120 
Czech 12.070 18.825 1.330 10.970 21.602 1.890 9.300 23.859 1.370 11.270 23.590 1.420 
India 5.940 18.977 1.250 5.700 19.488 2.450 6.200 21.539 1.430 6.800 20.648 1.270 
Indonesia 12.570 22.279 1.340 8.530 21.014 1.790 5.370 21.918 1.400 9.330 22.373 1.370 
Malaysia 9.850 22.831 1.410 7.300 21.545 1.780 8.170 20.986 0.610 7.100 20.541 0.600 
Mexico 10.240 22.112 2.510 8.600 21.916 2.900 8.400 22.768 1.160 8.530 22.998 1.040 
Pakistan 8.920 19.244 1.730 10.530 17.503 2.420 10.430 19.023 2.360 10.630 18.779 1.030 
Peru 8.500 21.180 3.060 7.730 21.341 1.210 8.170 23.541 1.340 4.830 21.483 1.660 
Philippines 9.510 22.701 1.700 10.080 23.156 1.860 7.190 22.654 1.320 6.770 22.455 1.350 
Poland 6.770 23.315 2.730 9.470 22.913 2.020 7.170 22.696 1.050 6.400 21.275 1.210 
Taiwan 13.700 23.702 1.860 13.670 23.396 3.080 13.670 22.026 0.920 12.770 22.742 1.200 
Thailand 11.380 22.672 1.360 16.070 20.523 3.020 12.530 20.138 1.230 13.200 20.956 1.070 
Turkey 10.770 18.522 3.360 7.800 22.307 4.370 9.200 23.195 1.740 8.400 22.992 1.730 
Table 3a: Regressions of stock price synchronicity on economy variables across 40 countries in each of years 1995 through 2012. Regressions follow that in MYY (2000)’s 
Table 4. Control variables are GDP and NSTK. Structural variables include geographical size, variance of GDP quarterly growth rate, industry Herfindahl index, firm 
Herfindahl index, and earnings co-movement in each country. In addition the good government index (GGI) for each country is used in the cross-sectional regression to 
explain the stock price synchronicity variable 𝑗,𝑦 = log  𝑅𝑗,𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑦
2 ) where  𝑅𝑗,𝑦
2  is error-weighted, i.e. LERW. Regression follows Eq. (7) in paper. Numbers within 
parentheses indicate the associated p-values. 
 
 
Year  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Intercept 2.782 0.043 0.909 -0.210 -1.681 -1.763 -0.161 -0.067 -1.625 -1.303 -0.984 -0.949 -1.825 0.733 -1.215 -0.740 0.871 -1.314 
 (0.15) (0.97) (0.59) (0.89) (0.19) (0.20) (0.87) (0.95) (0.18) (0.29) (0.43) (0.52) (0.22) (0.58) (0.35) (0.64) (0.52) (0.33) 
GDP -0.222 -0.044 -0.100 0.079 0.068 0.065 0.048 0.016 0.090 -0.084 -0.018 -0.010 0.142 -0.038 0.147 0.018 -0.180 0.005 
 (0.16) (0.68) (0.36) (0.42) (0.40) (0.53) (0.53) (0.84) (0.32) (0.36) (0.83) (0.92) (0.21) (0.67) (0.11) (0.88) (0.09) (0.96) 
NSTK -0.162 0.043 0.101 -0.070 0.026 0.047 0.029 0.007 -0.010 0.129 0.053 -0.051 -0.030 -0.021 -0.015 -0.024 -0.011 0.052 
 (0.30) (0.72) (0.45) (0.56) (0.81) (0.68) (0.76) (0.93) (0.91) (0.16) (0.49) (0.56) (0.72) (0.76) (0.84) (0.77) (0.87) (0.44) 
GEO -0.070 -0.075 -0.143 -0.113 -0.082 -0.066 -0.090 -0.080 -0.046 -0.036 -0.014 0.027 -0.011 -0.064 -0.050 -0.081 -0.060 -0.034 
 (0.31) (0.14) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.18) (0.03) (0.06) (0.30) (0.45) (0.74) (0.60) (0.85) (0.18) (0.30) (0.17) (0.23) (0.50) 
VGDP 267.7 139.1 253.6 445.6 28.5 103.9 90.5 96.3 74.0 130.7 -34.9 211.1 190.4 -8.3 -242.1 197.9 238.4 161.1 
 (0.08) (0.30) (0.15) (0.01) (0.55) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.26) (0.43) (0.82) (0.24) (0.80) (0.99) (0.48) (0.24) (0.08) (0.20) 
IHHI -1.643 -1.015 1.644 0.699 1.336 1.431 -1.267 -2.522 -1.779 1.393 -0.996 -1.200 -1.139 -2.220 -0.465 -2.171 -1.951 -1.423 
 (0.30) (0.44) (0.22) (0.63) (0.24) (0.30) (0.25) (0.08) (0.27) (0.47) (0.52) (0.51) (0.44) (0.05) (0.65) (0.09) (0.08) (0.21) 
FHHI -10.075 -2.771 -6.941 -3.315 -0.482 -0.291 -0.069 -3.242 2.423 -0.696 2.051 0.438 2.372 2.915 1.765 1.432 0.878 0.826 
 (0.04) (0.40) (0.08) (0.38) (0.88) (0.94) (0.98) (0.35) (0.48) (0.75) (0.35) (0.85) (0.42) (0.12) (0.45) (0.60) (0.71) (0.67) 
ECI 0.810 0.710 0.573 0.886 2.566 1.172 1.354 2.099 1.410 0.022 -0.281 -0.614 -0.344 -0.130 -0.508 1.542 1.318 0.433 
 (0.35) (0.33) (0.48) (0.37) (0.01) (0.14) (0.17) (0.03) (0.17) (0.98) (0.80) (0.54) (0.77) (0.92) (0.65) (0.29) (0.32) (0.69) 
GGI -0.073 -0.110 -0.086 -0.084 -0.108 -0.094 -0.120 -0.111 -0.096 -0.076 -0.111 -0.088 -0.100 -0.067 -0.097 -0.059 -0.040 -0.089 
 (0.09) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.11) (0.00) 
F-Statistic 2.408 3.375 3.145 3.886 6.983 3.053 6.137 5.481 3.100 2.893 5.653 3.281 2.328 2.613 2.596 1.479 2.623 2.719 
Sample Size  40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.383 0.466 0.448 0.501 0.643 0.441 0.613 0.586 0.444 0.427 0.593 0.458 0.375 0.403 0.401 0.276 0.404 0.412 
Adj  R2 0.224 0.328 0.306 0.372 0.551 0.296 0.513 0.479 0.301 0.280 0.488 0.319 0.214 0.249 0.247 0.090 0.250 0.261 
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Table 3b: Regressions of stock price synchronicity on economy variables across 40 countries in each of years 1995 through 2012. Regressions follow that in MYY (2000)’s 
Table 4. Control variables are GDP and NSTK. Structural variables include geographical size, variance of GDP quarterly growth rate, industry Herfindahl index, firm 
Herfindahl index, and earnings co-movement in each country. In addition the good government index (GGI) for each country is used in the cross-sectional regression to 
explain the stock price synchronicity variable 𝑗,𝑦 = log  𝑅𝑗,𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑦
2 ) where  𝑅𝑗,𝑦
2  is equal-weighted, i.e. LEQW. Regression follows Eq. (7) in paper. Numbers within 
parentheses indicate the associated p-values. 
 
 
Year  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Intercept 0.622 -0.192 0.631 -1.045 -1.674 -1.567 -0.106 -0.257 -1.940 -1.092 -1.927 -2.014 -1.302 -0.317 -1.572 -1.276 0.504 -0.400 
 (0.70) (0.88) (0.67) (0.41) (0.17) (0.20) (0.92) (0.80) (0.06) (0.23) (0.03) (0.09) (0.27) (0.79) (0.15) (0.28) (0.66) (0.74) 
GDP 0.004 -0.003 -0.059 0.081 0.066 0.041 0.062 0.006 0.125 -0.033 0.042 0.076 0.144 0.024 0.104 0.032 -0.098 -0.024 
 (0.97) (0.98) (0.54) (0.30) (0.39) (0.66) (0.43) (0.94) (0.11) (0.62) (0.48) (0.34) (0.11) (0.77) (0.17) (0.72) (0.28) (0.81) 
NSTK -0.063 0.095 0.130 0.096 0.139 0.097 0.050 0.102 0.060 0.117 0.041 0.012 0.013 0.069 0.095 0.025 0.012 0.010 
 (0.63) (0.42) (0.27) (0.32) (0.17) (0.34) (0.60) (0.24) (0.42) (0.09) (0.45) (0.86) (0.84) (0.27) (0.12) (0.67) (0.84) (0.87) 
GEO -0.081 -0.107 -0.159 -0.127 -0.119 -0.104 -0.123 -0.113 -0.076 -0.070 -0.022 0.001 -0.077 -0.096 -0.069 -0.096 -0.096 -0.088 
 (0.17) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.47) (0.99) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
VGDP 113.8 37.0 142.2 399.6 23.8 79.5 84.1 103.7 82.2 123.5 96.0 176.2 -43.7 161.9 -199.4 150.3 237.6 105.0 
 (0.37) (0.78) (0.36) (0.00) (0.60) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14) (0.31) (0.37) (0.22) (0.94) (0.83) (0.49) (0.23) (0.04) (0.35) 
IHHI -0.043 1.076 2.255 2.104 1.624 1.049 -1.107 -1.048 -0.546 0.363 -0.566 0.075 -0.843 -1.742 0.155 -1.345 -1.427 -1.105 
 (0.97) (0.40) (0.06) (0.08) (0.13) (0.40) (0.33) (0.46) (0.69) (0.79) (0.60) (0.96) (0.46) (0.08) (0.86) (0.15) (0.13) (0.28) 
FHHI -3.710 -3.457 -6.020 -5.276 -1.011 0.454 -1.449 -4.131 -0.154 -0.057 0.199 -1.393 1.269 2.173 0.339 1.254 -0.390 -0.300 
 (0.35) (0.28) (0.08) (0.09) (0.73) (0.89) (0.66) (0.24) (0.96) (0.97) (0.90) (0.44) (0.58) (0.19) (0.86) (0.54) (0.84) (0.86) 
ECI 0.619 -0.054 0.008 0.095 1.692 0.796 1.426 0.930 0.897 0.264 1.155 -0.035 -0.114 0.538 -0.364 2.043 0.848 0.665 
 (0.40) (0.94) (0.99) (0.90) (0.05) (0.26) (0.16) (0.31) (0.30) (0.71) (0.15) (0.97) (0.90) (0.62) (0.70) (0.07) (0.45) (0.50) 
GGI -0.116 -0.097 -0.077 -0.070 -0.100 -0.072 -0.110 -0.087 -0.080 -0.068 -0.083 -0.076 -0.083 -0.063 -0.075 -0.035 -0.027 -0.051 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.11) (0.20) (0.04) 
F-Statistic 2.731 2.401 3.306 4.764 5.850 2.609 5.292 4.098 3.129 3.963 5.788 2.362 2.265 2.509 2.381 1.857 2.085 1.533 
Sample Size  40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.413 0.383 0.460 0.551 0.602 0.402 0.577 0.514 0.447 0.506 0.599 0.379 0.369 0.393 0.381 0.324 0.350 0.283 
Adj  R2 0.262 0.223 0.321 0.436 0.499 0.248 0.468 0.389 0.304 0.378 0.495 0.218 0.206 0.236 0.221 0.150 0.182 0.098 
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Table 3c: Regressions of stock price synchronicity on economy variables across 40 countries in each of years 1995 through 2012. In addition to control, structural, and GGI 
variables, additional country-level variable of market index volatility IVOL is included. Control variables are GDP and NSTK. Structural variables include geographical size, 
variance of GDP quarterly growth rate, industry Herfindahl index, firm Herfindahl index, and earnings co-movement in each country. Dependent stock price synchronicity variable 
is 𝑗,𝑦 = log  𝑅𝑗,𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑦
2 )  where  𝑅𝑗,𝑦
2  is error-weighted, i.e. LERW.  Regression follows Eq. (8) in paper. Numbers within parentheses indicate the associated p-values. 
 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Intercept 1.440 -0.227 0.259 -0.304 -1.991 -2.024 -0.867 -0.440 -1.821 -3.224 -1.414 -2.999 -3.927 -0.670 -2.593 -1.989 -2.891 -1.813 
 
(0.41) (0.86) (0.89) (0.87) (0.13) (0.12) (0.37) (0.67) (0.15) (0.01) (0.32) (0.04) (0.02) (0.69) (0.06) (0.25) (0.07) (0.22) 
GDP -0.280 -0.091 -0.093 0.081 0.075 0.050 0.046 0.026 0.074 0.034 0.018 0.092 0.240 0.039 0.134 0.014 -0.027 0.004 
 
(0.05) (0.39) (0.40) (0.42) (0.36) (0.60) (0.52) (0.74) (0.42) (0.70) (0.85) (0.32) (0.04) (0.71) (0.12) (0.90) (0.78) (0.97) 
NSTK -0.031 0.133 0.099 -0.067 0.026 0.041 0.049 0.015 -0.016 0.176 0.070 0.067 -0.006 -0.007 0.004 0.046 0.088 0.078 
 
(0.83) (0.29) (0.46) (0.59) (0.80) (0.70) (0.57) (0.86) (0.86) (0.03) (0.39) (0.42) (0.94) (0.92) (0.96) (0.61) (0.17) (0.29) 
GEO -0.112 -0.106 -0.131 -0.112 -0.074 -0.064 -0.072 -0.075 -0.032 -0.051 -0.025 -0.020 -0.006 -0.058 -0.023 -0.070 -0.025 -0.024 
 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.16) (0.06) (0.07) (0.50) (0.22) (0.58) (0.67) (0.91) (0.22) (0.61) (0.23) (0.56) (0.64) 
VGDP -50.6 123.9 192.1 435.1 11.2 40.1 43.2 79.6 55.3 -134.8 -70.3 -30.9 -47.9 -128.3 -487.6 183.9 89.3 152.9 
 
(0.76) (0.34) (0.30) (0.02) (0.82) (0.51) (0.42) (0.18) (0.43) (0.41) (0.66) (0.86) (0.95) (0.88) (0.15) (0.26) (0.45) (0.22) 
IHHI -0.622 -0.686 1.635 0.709 0.999 0.268 -1.560 -2.789 -1.961 1.447 -0.954 -0.630 -0.744 -1.825 -0.462 -1.677 -1.132 -1.402 
 
(0.66) (0.59) (0.22) (0.63) (0.40) (0.84) (0.13) (0.05) (0.23) (0.38) (0.54) (0.69) (0.59) (0.11) (0.63) (0.18) (0.24) (0.22) 
FHHI -11.546 -4.357 -5.867 -3.213 -0.218 1.605 1.044 -1.766 3.007 -0.826 1.910 0.354 2.196 2.864 3.301 1.874 3.737 1.477 
 
(0.01) (0.18) (0.15) (0.42) (0.94) (0.65) (0.73) (0.61) (0.39) (0.66) (0.39) (0.86) (0.43) (0.12) (0.15) (0.48) (0.09) (0.48) 
ECI 0.899 0.279 0.543 0.881 2.310 0.721 0.174 1.579 0.968 0.186 -0.251 -0.736 -0.776 -0.553 -0.410 0.913 0.524 0.060 
 
(0.24) (0.70) (0.50) (0.38) (0.02) (0.34) (0.86) (0.10) (0.40) (0.83) (0.82) (0.40) (0.49) (0.66) (0.69) (0.53) (0.64) (0.96) 
GGI -0.010 -0.088 -0.074 -0.083 -0.109 -0.091 -0.117 -0.120 -0.092 -0.091 -0.116 -0.091 -0.092 -0.078 -0.096 -0.059 -0.071 -0.088 
 
(0.81) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
IVOL 0.671 0.415 0.150 0.014 0.165 0.333 0.355 0.243 0.206 0.885 0.188 0.862 0.621 0.261 0.555 0.600 0.975 0.259 
 (0.00) (0.06) (0.30) (0.92) (0.28) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.39) (0.00) (0.49) (0.00) (0.03) (0.19) (0.02) (0.12) (0.00) (0.36) 
F-Statistic 3.935 3.682 2.927 3.346 6.387 3.822 7.160 5.397 2.821 4.688 4.995 5.022 2.923 2.585 3.382 1.669 4.802 2.504 
Sample Size 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.541 0.525 0.468 0.501 0.657 0.534 0.682 0.618 0.458 0.584 0.600 0.601 0.467 0.437 0.504 0.334 0.590 0.429 
Adj  R2 0.404 0.382 0.308 0.351 0.554 0.394 0.587 0.504 0.296 0.460 0.480 0.481 0.307 0.268 0.355 0.134 0.467 0.258 
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Table 3d: Regressions of stock price synchronicity on economy variables across 40 countries in each of years 1995 through 2012. In addition to control, structural, and GGI 
variables, additional country-level variable of market index volatility IVOL is included. Control variables are GDP and NSTK. Structural variables include geographical size, 
variance of GDP quarterly growth rate, industry Herfindahl index, firm Herfindahl index, and earnings co-movement in each country. Dependent stock price synchronicity variable 
is 𝑗,𝑦 = log  𝑅𝑗,𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑦
2 )  where  𝑅𝑗,𝑦
2  is equal-weighted, i.e. LEQW.  Regression follows Eq. (8) in paper. Numbers within parentheses indicate the associated p-values. 
 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Intercept -0.655 -0.339 -0.018 -1.465 -2.213 -1.853 -0.763 -0.694 -2.257 -1.890 -1.991 -2.852 -1.680 -0.369 -2.385 -2.514 -2.322 -1.401 
 
(0.64) (0.80) (0.99) (0.32) (0.06) (0.09) (0.45) (0.49) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.24) (0.81) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.26) 
GDP -0.052 -0.028 -0.052 0.090 0.078 0.025 0.060 0.017 0.099 0.016 0.047 0.118 0.161 0.026 0.097 0.028 0.017 -0.027 
 
(0.64) (0.79) (0.59) (0.27) (0.28) (0.75) (0.42) (0.82) (0.19) (0.82) (0.50) (0.16) (0.10) (0.79) (0.20) (0.74) (0.85) (0.78) 
NSTK 0.062 0.144 0.128 0.109 0.140 0.091 0.069 0.111 0.050 0.136 0.044 0.061 0.017 0.069 0.106 0.094 0.087 0.061 
 
(0.59) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.14) (0.32) (0.45) (0.19) (0.49) (0.04) (0.45) (0.43) (0.79) (0.28) (0.08) (0.15) (0.14) (0.33) 
GEO -0.121 -0.123 -0.147 -0.123 -0.105 -0.101 -0.106 -0.106 -0.053 -0.076 -0.023 -0.019 -0.076 -0.096 -0.054 -0.085 -0.069 -0.068 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.17) (0.03) (0.47) (0.66) (0.10) (0.03) (0.19) (0.05) (0.08) (0.13) 
VGDP -189.0 28.80 80.80 352.3 -6.500 9.300 40.20 84.10 51.90 13.30 90.70 77.30 -86.60 157.5 -344.3 136.3 125.6 88.60 
 
(0.16) (0.83) (0.62) (0.02) (0.88) (0.86) (0.47) (0.16) (0.36) (0.92) (0.43) (0.62) (0.89) (0.84) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.41) 
IHHI 0.928 1.254 2.247 2.151 1.036 -0.232 -1.379 -1.361 -0.841 0.386 -0.560 0.308 -0.772 -1.728 0.157 -0.855 -0.811 -1.063 
 
(0.42) (0.34) (0.06) (0.08) (0.32) (0.84) (0.20) (0.32) (0.53) (0.77) (0.61) (0.83) (0.51) (0.10) (0.85) (0.35) (0.34) (0.27) 
FHHI -5.110 -4.316 -4.947 -4.820 -0.551 2.540 -0.415 -2.399 0.794 -0.111 0.178 -1.428 1.237 2.171 1.245 1.692 1.758 1.005 
 
(0.13) (0.19) (0.16) (0.14) (0.84) (0.40) (0.89) (0.49) (0.78) (0.94) (0.91) (0.42) (0.60) (0.19) (0.53) (0.38) (0.36) (0.57) 
ECI 0.704 -0.287 -0.022 0.074 1.246 0.300 0.328 0.320 0.180 0.332 1.160 -0.085 -0.192 0.523 -0.306 1.419 0.251 -0.083 
 
(0.26) (0.70) (0.97) (0.93) (0.14) (0.64) (0.76) (0.73) (0.85) (0.63) (0.15) (0.91) (0.84) (0.65) (0.74) (0.19) (0.80) (0.93) 
GGI -0.056 -0.085 -0.065 -0.066 -0.102 -0.068 -0.106 -0.097 -0.074 -0.075 -0.084 -0.078 -0.082 -0.063 -0.074 -0.035 -0.050 -0.049 
 
(0.11) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.09) (0.02) (0.04) 
IVOL 0.639 0.225 0.150 0.064 0.288 0.366 0.330 0.285 0.335 0.367 0.028 0.352 0.112 0.010 0.327 0.595 0.733 0.519 
 (0.00) (0.31) (0.24) (0.57) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.88) (0.15) (0.63) (0.96) (0.11) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) 
F-Statistic 5.052 2.256 3.139 4.181 6.335 4.099 5.932 4.336 3.314 4.064 4.985 2.426 1.989 2.159 2.544 2.391 3.426 2.066 
Sample Size 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.602 0.404 0.485 0.556 0.655 0.551 0.640 0.565 0.499 0.549 0.599 0.421 0.374 0.393 0.433 0.418 0.507 0.383 
Adj R2 0.483 0.225 0.330 0.423 0.552 0.417 0.532 0.435 0.348 0.414 0.479 0.248 0.186 0.211 0.263 0.243 0.359 0.197 
Table 4: Regressions of decile stock price synchronicity on economy variables across 40 countries in each of years 1995 through 2012. Dependent stock price synchronicity variable 
is 𝑑,𝑗,𝑦 = log  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 ) where  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2  is equal-weighted across stocks in each decile. Regression follows Eq. (8) in paper. In addition to control, structural, GGI and IVOL 
variables, additional country-decile size variables of log average decile capitalization per firm, ACAP, are included. Control variables are GDP and NSTK. Structural variables include 
geographical size, variance of GDP quarterly growth rate, industry Herfindahl index, firm Herfindahl index, and earnings co-movement in each country. Numbers within parentheses 
indicate the associated p-values. Note that the cross-sectional sample size is 400 as there are 10 deciles in each of 40 countries. The F-statistics are all significant at p-values of less than 
0.0001. 
 Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Intercept -1.780 -2.382 -3.304 -3.789 -4.556 -3.259 -2.877 -3.172 -3.784 -5.306 -4.602 -2.625 -4.169 -2.485 -4.574 -3.879 -4.093 -4.308 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP -0.064 -0.065 -0.122 0.013 -0.034 -0.075 -0.081 -0.215 -0.042 -0.102 -0.086 -0.044 0.052 -0.091 0.038 -0.079 -0.121 -0.093 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.39) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NSTK 0.020 0.117 0.208 0.142 0.125 0.144 0.151 0.194 0.117 0.185 0.130 0.125 0.132 0.163 0.150 0.146 0.197 0.172 
 (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GEO -0.099 -0.108 -0.123 -0.108 -0.069 -0.104 -0.107 -0.082 -0.093 -0.039 -0.005 -0.129 -0.096 -0.109 -0.054 -0.079 -0.092 -0.091 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
VGDP -88.13 52.87 203.81 511.44 38.14 22.95 63.27 137.82 73.50 42.43 113.12 174.17 57.78 533.15 -313.01 37.80 69.35 62.96 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.66) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.02) (0.00) 
IHHI 0.173 0.086 2.287 1.897 1.684 0.011 -1.029 -0.843 -0.850 1.445 0.411 -0.444 -0.429 -1.611 0.029 -0.421 -0.438 -0.977 
 (0.48) (0.66) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.97) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.12) (0.08) (0.00) (0.91) (0.08) (0.04) (0.00) 
FHHI -2.533 -3.353 -4.073 -5.404 -0.620 0.174 -2.550 -6.273 -1.292 -0.094 -0.085 -3.563 -0.033 1.461 1.033 0.902 1.285 1.311 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.79) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.71) (0.79) (0.00) (0.95) (0.00) (0.10) (0.12) (0.01) (0.00) 
ECI 0.496 -0.402 0.476 0.325 1.258 0.417 -0.121 1.062 1.255 1.197 1.676 -0.316 0.585 -0.039 -0.104 0.954 1.981 0.090 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.86) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) 
GGI -0.073 -0.059 -0.039 -0.063 -0.066 -0.051 -0.064 -0.054 -0.063 -0.045 -0.054 -0.046 -0.070 -0.039 -0.064 -0.013 -0.034 -0.040 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
IVOL 0.524 0.716 0.389 0.113 0.322 0.372 0.444 0.380 0.350 0.400 -0.010 0.325 0.121 -0.043 0.360 0.671 0.618 0.537 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.77) (0.00) (0.02) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ACAP 0.077 0.077 0.106 0.123 0.113 0.093 0.114 0.143 0.126 0.143 0.119 0.104 0.131 0.139 0.108 0.088 0.112 0.140 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sample Size 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
R2 0.530 0.532 0.503 0.574 0.562 0.443 0.540 0.573 0.528 0.592 0.531 0.431 0.418 0.455 0.321 0.305 0.402 0.507 
Adj R2 0.517 0.520 0.490 0.563 0.550 0.429 0.529 0.562 0.516 0.582 0.519 0.416 0.403 0.441 0.303 0.287 0.387 0.495 
Table 5: Panel regressions of stock price synchronicity on economy variables, and different panels are used, which include 
country-panel, decile-country panel and sector-country panel. Dependent stock price synchronicity variable is 𝑑,𝑗,𝑦 =
log  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 ) where  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2  is equal-weighted across stocks in each decile. Regression follows Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) 
in the paper. In addition to control, structural, GGI, IVOL, and LSCI variables, additional country-decile size variables of 
log average decile capitalization per firm, ACAP are included. Control variables are GDP and NSTK. Structural variables 
include geographical size, variance of GDP quarterly growth rate, industry Herfindahl index, firm Herfindahl index, and 
earnings co-movement in each country. Numbers within parentheses indicate the t-statistics. Note that there are 40 countries 
(denoted by subscript j), 10 deciles (denoted by a subscript d), and 30 industry sectors (denoted by a subscript s), and 18 
years (1995 to 2012) (denoted by a subscript y) that are used in creating the panels.  
 Country Panel Decile-Country Panel Sector-Country Panel 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable LERW LEQR LERW LEQR LERW LEQR LERW LEQR 
         
ACAP -0.000 0.004 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 
(-0.09) (0.78) (10.41) (10.60) (7.29) (7.39) (4.38) (4.08) 
GGI -0.033*** -0.027*** 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.025** 0.031*** 
 
(-4.41) (-3.81) (0.84) (0.76) (0.91) (0.85) (2.29) (2.86) 
IVOL 0.141*** 0.097** 0.029 0.054 0.030 0.054 0.033 0.037 
 
(3.19) (2.32) (1.06) (1.60) (1.07) (1.59) (0.99) (1.09) 
LGDP 0.022 0.016 -0.065 -0.070 -0.075 -0.084 -0.099 -0.070 
 
(0.89) (0.68) (-1.03) (-0.91) (-1.19) (-1.10) (-1.35) (-0.93) 
LNSTOCK -0.022 -0.021 0.152*** 0.184*** 0.136*** 0.159*** 0.099*** 0.096*** 
 
(-0.83) (-0.81) (7.07) (6.89) (6.35) (5.95) (9.45) (8.56) 
Lgeo -0.003 -0.013 0.188*** 0.217*** 0.197*** 0.231*** -4.525*** -4.392*** 
 
(-0.27) (-1.24) (3.68) (3.68) (3.87) (3.91) (-11.13) (-10.58) 
Vgdpg 4.317 10.563 17.758 12.849 16.945 11.464 11.801 5.104 
 
(0.19) (0.47) (1.13) (0.64) (1.08) (0.57) (0.72) (0.30) 
ECI 0.839*** 0.871*** 0.085 0.071 0.079 0.062 0.154 0.059 
 
(3.24) (3.43) (0.54) (0.37) (0.51) (0.33) (0.86) (0.31) 
IHHI 0.218 0.094 -0.330 -0.305 -0.549 -0.626 -0.046 -0.034 
 
(0.49) (0.21) (-0.70) (-0.52) (-1.15) (-1.04) (-0.24) (-0.19) 
FHHI 0.598 0.863 0.258 0.207 0.095 -0.029 -0.623 -0.624 
 
(0.92) (1.29) (0.39) (0.25) (0.14) (-0.03) (-1.35) (-1.35) 
_cons -2.941*** -2.727*** -5.290*** -7.231*** -6.282*** -8.452*** 68.730*** 66.127***  
(-8.58) (-8.47) (-13.88) (-16.22) (-13.08) (-15.06) (10.79) (10.23)          
N 720 720 7200 7200 7200 7200 15218 15218 
R-sq 0.186 0.193 0.500 0.466 0.506 0.477 0.423 0.371 
adj. R-sq 0.154 0.162 0.495 0.461 0.501 0.471 0.420 0.367 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Decile Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
  
Table 6: For every year from 1995 to 2012, the sample correlation of every pair of weekly returns of firms in each decile 
is computed for each country. These sample correlations are then averaged across all firms in the same decile per year per 
country. The table shows the average of the yearly averages for each decile in each country. 
  
 Deciles 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 
A) Developed Countries 
Australia 0.0566 0.0314 0.0270 0.0150 0.0167 0.0157 0.0149 0.0100 0.0039 0.0062 
Austria 0.0844 0.0529 0.1041 0.0426 0.0307 0.0349 0.0174 0.0176 0.0067 0.0047 
Belgium 0.0388 0.0314 0.0237 0.0494 0.0415 0.0251 0.0184 0.0067 0.0009 0.0012 
Canada 0.1179 0.0770 0.0610 0.0462 0.0359 0.0291 0.0226 0.0188 0.0112 0.0042 
Denmark 0.2200 0.1964 0.1971 0.1705 0.1280 0.0939 0.0924 0.0487 0.0443 0.0557 
Finland 0.0804 0.0892 0.0623 0.0647 0.0340 0.0484 0.0323 0.0484 0.0290 0.0110 
France 0.2891 0.2513 0.2102 0.1299 0.1291 0.0957 0.0712 0.0471 0.0379 0.0105 
Germany 0.2593 0.2014 0.1303 0.0845 0.0881 0.0636 0.0489 0.0417 0.0179 0.0091 
Greece 0.0637 0.0682 0.0909 0.0969 0.0920 0.1279 0.1479 0.1254 0.1558 0.1269 
Holland 0.1303 0.0897 0.0638 0.0448 0.0478 0.0375 0.0152 0.0170 0.0056 0.0037 
Hong Kong 0.2106 0.1872 0.1636 0.1342 0.1312 0.1117 0.1026 0.0923 0.0803 0.0601 
Ireland 0.0540 0.0294 0.0428 0.0478 0.0226 0.0185 0.0083 0.0051 0.0003 0.0001 
Italy 0.2254 0.2463 0.2245 0.2517 0.1682 0.1762 0.1767 0.1722 0.1504 0.1158 
Japan 0.2813 0.2585 0.2466 0.2330 0.2166 0.2166 0.1739 0.1605 0.1377 0.1540 
Korea 0.1313 0.0711 0.0499 0.0278 0.0418 0.0442 0.0337 0.0418 0.0421 0.0368 
New Zealand 0.0643 0.0584 0.0407 0.0247 0.0188 0.0232 0.0076 0.0074 0.0029 0.0033 
Norway 0.0987 0.0734 0.0405 0.0300 0.0285 0.0263 0.0220 0.0174 0.0113 0.0037 
Portugal 0.0140 0.0315 0.0155 0.0389 0.0436 0.0270 0.0195 0.0119 0.0039 0.0027 
Singapore 0.1787 0.1934 0.1657 0.1345 0.1465 0.1185 0.1309 0.0790 0.0511 0.0369 
Spain 0.3764 0.2885 0.2719 0.2279 0.1586 0.1337 0.1370 0.1345 0.0682 0.0489 
South Africa 0.0694 0.0446 0.0381 0.0270 0.0237 0.0164 0.0115 0.0077 0.0069 0.0032 
Sweden 0.2812 0.2542 0.2263 0.1936 0.1504 0.1165 0.0945 0.1085 0.0796 0.0458 
UK 0.2040 0.1779 0.1158 0.0769 0.0562 0.0522 0.0463 0.0321 0.0257 0.0160 
US 0.2369 0.2249 0.1902 0.1732 0.1562 0.1330 0.1072 0.0839 0.0536 0.0373 
Average 0.1569 0.1345 0.1168 0.0986 0.0836 0.0744 0.0647 0.0557 0.0428 0.0332 
B) Developing Countries 
Brazil 0.1128 0.0880 0.0439 0.0416 0.0175 0.0092 0.0027 0.0027 0.0018 0.0017 
Chile 0.1834 0.0943 0.0494 0.0284 0.0136 0.0068 0.0036 0.0034 -0.0002 0.0010 
China 0.3626 0.3675 0.3865 0.3959 0.4216 0.4104 0.4265 0.4308 0.4187 0.3030 
Colombia 0.1309 0.0145 0.0065 0.0040 0.0052 -0.0002 0.0039 0.0023 0.0009 0.0046 
Czech 0.1061 0.0453 0.0396 0.0348 0.0337 0.0255 0.0175 0.0188 0.0038 0.0021 
India 0.2538 0.2459 0.2206 0.2205 0.2043 0.1996 0.1956 0.1890 0.1654 0.1289 
Indonesia 0.1532 0.0749 0.0552 0.0433 0.0340 0.0293 0.0256 0.0358 0.0231 0.0055 
Malaysia 0.3026 0.2375 0.2281 0.1898 0.1846 0.1770 0.1556 0.0922 0.0805 0.0657 
Mexico 0.1490 0.0621 0.0281 0.0137 0.0180 0.0082 0.0062 0.0024 0.0039 0.0007 
Pakistan 0.2207 0.1126 0.0795 0.0625 0.0206 0.0206 0.0141 0.0035 0.0086 0.0046 
Peru 0.1231 0.0314 0.0157 0.0200 0.0219 0.0235 0.0114 0.0248 0.0074 0.0037 
Philippines 0.1802 0.1239 0.0594 0.0517 0.0409 0.0240 0.0573 0.0180 0.0215 0.0148 
Poland 0.1503 0.1063 0.0766 0.0605 0.0834 0.0743 0.0589 0.0130 0.0194 0.0332 
Taiwan 0.3092 0.2836 0.2719 0.2588 0.2495 0.2364 0.2189 0.1993 0.1511 0.0952 
Thailand 0.2672 0.2834 0.2859 0.2166 0.2403 0.2132 0.2233 0.2029 0.1954 0.0719 
Turkey 0.1587 0.1764 0.2139 0.2394 0.2316 0.2078 0.2558 0.2201 0.1979 0.1170 
Average 0.1977 0.1467 0.1288 0.1176 0.1138 0.1041 0.1048 0.0912 0.0812 0.0534 
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Table 7: For every year from 1995 to 2012, the sample correlation of every pair of weekly returns of the largest 
firms in the first 3 deciles in each industry sector is computed for each country. These sample correlations are then 
averaged across the firms in the same industry per year per country. These numbers are then multiplied by the 
corresponding value weights in the first 3 deciles and the last 3 deciles to arrive at the Large Capital Index (LCI) 
and Small Capital Index (SCI) respectively for each country. The sum of these 2 indexes constitutes the LSCI. The 
following figures show the various countries’ LCI and SCI. 
 
  1995 2000 2005 2010 
  LCI SCI LCI SCI LCI SCI LCI SCI 
       
A)  Developed Countries       
       
Australia 0.096 0.040 0.113 0.029 0.130 0.035 0.126 0.040 
Austria 0.161 0.011 0.176 0.011 0.200 0.035 0.208 0.028 
Belgium 0.310 -0.037 0.301 -0.030 0.303 0.044 0.308 0.047 
Canada 0.098 0.031 0.125 0.032 0.124 0.026 0.127 0.026 
Denmark 0.195 0.078 0.183 0.062 0.203 0.070 0.214 0.065 
Finland 0.187 0.130 0.369 0.152 0.473 0.241 0.478 0.234 
France 0.104 0.022 0.121 0.030 0.122 0.021 0.125 0.021 
Germany 0.200 0.077 0.228 0.028 0.214 0.027 0.211 0.025 
Greece 0.379 0.285 0.473 0.260 0.494 0.310 0.494 0.312 
Holland 0.303 0.228 0.302 0.207 0.330 0.236 0.336 0.258 
Hong Kong 0.203 0.150 0.265 0.167 0.201 0.203 0.286 0.145 
Ireland 0.143 0.021 0.124 0.063 0.128 0.030 0.134 0.068 
Italy 0.371 0.161 0.419 0.162 0.418 0.162 0.419 0.166 
Japan 0.314 0.179 0.301 0.193 0.303 0.189 0.301 0.208 
Korea 0.299 0.175 0.255 0.119 0.268 0.127 0.274 0.143 
New Zealand 0.139 -0.016 0.138 -0.016 0.165 0.002 0.161 -0.009 
Norway 0.198 0.112 0.262 0.094 0.216 0.101 0.217 0.098 
Portugal 0.091 0.079 0.097 0.105 0.096 0.100 0.096 0.102 
Singapore 0.253 0.403 0.259 0.419 0.284 0.219 0.275 0.102 
Spain 0.256 0.129 0.227 0.119 0.249 0.156 0.256 0.164 
Sweden 0.259 0.052 0.237 0.046 0.239 0.041 0.259 0.047 
South Africa 0.191 0.087 0.207 0.129 0.223 0.141 0.221 0.121 
UK 0.091 0.047 0.091 0.041 0.096 0.046 0.107 0.044 
US 0.218 0.048 0.249 0.055 0.202 0.054 0.195 0.054 
Average 0.211 0.104 0.230 0.103 0.237 0.109 0.243 0.105 
       
B)  Developing Countries       
       
Brazil 0.164 0.245 0.188 0.140 0.184 0.130 0.210 0.162 
Chile 0.125 0.061 0.127 0.103 0.137 0.089 0.116 0.086 
China 0.430 0.392 0.442 0.382 0.441 0.401 0.443 0.430 
Columbia 0.125 0.108 0.122 0.055 0.123 0.040 0.121 -0.054 
Czech 0.205 0.057 0.229 0.035 0.187 0.032 0.201 0.032 
India 0.350 0.119 0.332 0.190 0.335 0.217 0.314 0.242 
Indonesia 0.160 0.109 0.166 0.090 0.154 0.091 0.153 0.102 
Malaysia 0.337 0.269 0.376 0.257 0.372 0.225 0.377 0.249 
Mexico 0.191 0.098 0.218 0.122 0.247 0.126 0.241 0.145 
Pakistan 0.248 0.054 0.279 0.055 0.374 0.055 0.387 0.056 
Peru 0.035 -0.040 0.110 0.105 0.146 0.077 0.243 0.118 
Philippines 0.250 0.090 0.276 0.087 0.256 0.059 0.229 0.075 
Poland 0.319 0.034 0.244 0.039 0.225 0.031 0.187 0.019 
Taiwan 0.370 0.169 0.373 0.183 0.381 0.182 0.376 0.162 
Thailand 0.292 0.156 0.246 0.150 0.216 0.124 0.217 0.114 
Turkey 0.374 0.196 0.345 0.162 0.347 0.167 0.376 0.162 
Average 0.248 0.132 0.255 0.135 0.258 0.128 0.262 0.131 
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Table 8(a): Panel regressions of stock price synchronicity on economy variables using different panels, which include 
country-panel, decile-country panel and sector-country panel. Dependent stock price synchronicity variable is 𝑑,𝑗,𝑦 =
log  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 ) where  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2  is equal-weighted across stocks in each decile. Regression follows Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) 
in the paper. In addition to control, structural, GGI, IVOL, and LSCI variables, additional country-decile size variables of 
log average decile capitalization per firm, ACAP are included. Control variables are GDP and NSTK. Structural variables 
include geographical size, variance of GDP quarterly growth rate, industry Herfindahl index, firm Herfindahl index, and 
earnings co-movement in each country. DMCI and IMCI represent the decile-based and industry sector-based (medium) 
correlation indices. Numbers in the parentheses indicate the t-statistics. Note that there are 40 countries (denoted by 
subscript j), 10 deciles (denoted by a subscript d), and 30 industry sectors (denoted by a subscript s), and 18 years (1995 to 
2012) (denoted by a subscript y) that are used in creating the panels. 
 Country Panel Decile-Country Panel Sector-Country Panel 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  LERW LEQR LERW LEQR LERW LEQR LERW LEQR 
DMCI / IMCI 1.895*** 2.127*** 0.871*** 0.979*** 0.872*** 0.978*** 1.306*** 1.287*** 
 
(5.06) (5.78) (3.42) (3.15) (3.41) (3.14) (4.47) (4.30) 
ACAP -0.000 0.004 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(-0.01) (0.93) (10.32) (10.52) (7.21) (7.33) (4.25) (3.96) 
GGI -0.023*** -0.015** 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.022** 0.028*** 
 
(-3.08) (-2.25) (0.68) (0.62) (0.76) (0.71) (2.09) (2.67) 
IVOL 0.034 -0.022 -0.008 0.013 -0.008 0.012 -0.027 -0.022 
 
(0.68) (-0.45) (-0.27) (0.35) (-0.26) (0.35) (-0.80) (-0.63) 
LGDP 0.015 0.008 -0.060 -0.065 -0.071 -0.079 -0.067 -0.038 
 
(0.62) (0.36) (-0.93) (-0.83) (-1.09) (-1.01) (-0.87) (-0.48) 
LNSTOCK -0.035 -0.035 0.155*** 0.187*** 0.139*** 0.161*** 0.101*** 0.099*** 
 
(-1.35) (-1.42) (7.23) (7.04) (6.54) (6.13) (9.77) (8.84) 
Lgeo 0.004 -0.006 0.179*** 0.208*** 0.189*** 0.221*** -4.520*** -4.387*** 
 
(0.37) (-0.57) (3.39) (3.40) (3.58) (3.62) (-11.35) (-11.02) 
Vgdpg -16.600 -12.914 16.506 11.442 15.693 10.059 11.940 5.240 
 
(-0.77) (-0.62) (1.08) (0.58) (1.03) (0.51) (0.76) (0.32) 
ECI 0.691*** 0.704*** 0.059 0.043 0.054 0.034 0.117 0.022 
 
(2.97) (3.17) (0.40) (0.23) (0.36) (0.19) (0.70) (0.13) 
IHHI -0.074 -0.234 -0.351 -0.329 -0.571 -0.650 -0.103 -0.090 
 
(-0.17) (-0.52) (-0.73) (-0.54) (-1.16) (-1.05) (-0.52) (-0.50) 
FHHI 0.933 1.239* 0.322 0.280 0.155 0.039 -0.270 -0.276 
 
(1.39) (1.79) (0.48) (0.33) (0.23) (0.05) (-0.57) (-0.58) 
_cons -3.059*** -2.860*** -6.119*** -8.214*** -6.194*** -8.353*** 68.328*** 65.731*** 
 
(-9.04) (-9.07) (-12.46) (-14.31) (-12.65) (-14.58) (10.98) (10.63)          
N 720 720 7200 7200 7200 7200 15218 15218 
R-sq 0.237 0.261 0.504 0.470 0.511 0.480 0.430 0.376 
adj. R-sq 0.206 0.231 0.499 0.465 0.505 0.474 0.427 0.373 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Decile Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 8(b): Panel regressions of stock price synchronicity on economy variables using different panels, which include 
country-panel, decile-country panel and sector-country panel. Dependent stock price synchronicity variable is 𝑑,𝑗,𝑦 =
log  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 ) where  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2  is equal-weighted across stocks in each decile. Regression follows Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) 
in the paper. In addition to control, structural, GGI, IVOL, and LSCI variables, additional country-decile size variables of 
log average decile capitalization per firm, ACAP are included. Control variables are GDP and NSTK. Structural variables 
include geographical size, variance of GDP quarterly growth rate, industry Herfindahl index, firm Herfindahl index, and 
earnings co-movement in each country. DSCI and ISCI represent the decile-based and industry sector-based (Range) 
correlation indices. Numbers in the parentheses indicate the t-statistics. Note that there are 40 countries (denoted by 
subscript j), 10 deciles (denoted by a subscript d), and 30 industry sectors (denoted by a subscript s), and 18 years (1995 to 
2012) (denoted by a subscript y) that are used in creating the panels. 
 Country Panel Decile-Country Panel Sector-Country Panel 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  LERW LEQR LERW LEQR LERW LEQR LERW LEQR 
DSCI / ISCI 2.379*** 2.472*** 1.161*** 1.386*** 1.141*** 1.353*** 1.302*** 1.374*** 
 
(7.24) (7.57) (4.47) (4.38) (4.39) (4.27) (4.51) (4.61) 
ACAP 0.002 0.007 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.46) (1.46) (10.28) (10.48) (7.18) (7.29) (4.16) (3.86) 
GGI -0.018** -0.011* 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.024** 0.029*** 
 
(-2.51) (-1.69) (0.80) (0.73) (0.87) (0.81) (2.23) (2.82) 
IVOL -0.012 -0.062 -0.021 -0.005 -0.020 -0.004 -0.025 -0.025 
 
(-0.25) (-1.35) (-0.71) (-0.15) (-0.66) (-0.11) (-0.74) (-0.70) 
LGDP 0.013 0.007 -0.062 -0.067 -0.072 -0.081 -0.088 -0.057 
 
(0.56) (0.30) (-0.94) (-0.83) (-1.10) (-1.01) (-1.14) (-0.72) 
LNSTOCK -0.048* -0.048** 0.162*** 0.195*** 0.145*** 0.170*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 
 
(-1.93) (-2.00) (7.63) (7.42) (6.94) (6.51) (9.85) (8.94) 
Lgeo 0.005 -0.005 0.176*** 0.204*** 0.186*** 0.217*** -4.456*** -4.320*** 
 
(0.54) (-0.48) (3.30) (3.28) (3.49) (3.51) (-11.07) (-10.76) 
Vgdpg -21.063 -15.809 20.328 15.918 19.490 14.483 16.393 9.949 
 
(-1.00) (-0.77) (1.36) (0.82) (1.29) (0.75) (1.03) (0.61) 
ECI 0.635*** 0.659*** 0.076 0.061 0.071 0.052 0.133 0.037 
 
(2.84) (3.10) (0.52) (0.34) (0.49) (0.29) (0.81) (0.22) 
IHHI -0.199 -0.339 -0.237 -0.194 -0.455 -0.514 -0.073 -0.063 
 
(-0.46) (-0.77) (-0.50) (-0.33) (-0.95) (-0.85) (-0.38) (-0.35) 
FHHI 1.079* 1.363** 0.197 0.134 0.034 -0.101 -0.402 -0.391 
 
(1.73) (2.11) (0.29) (0.16) (0.05) (-0.12) (-0.88) (-0.85) 
_cons -2.991*** -2.779*** -6.114*** -8.202*** -6.189*** -8.342*** 67.507*** 64.837***  
(-9.28) (-9.21) (-12.59) (-14.47) (-12.79) (-14.75) (10.72) (10.39) 
N 720 720 7200 7200 7200 7200 15218 15218 
R-sq 0.280 0.299 0.507 0.473 0.514 0.483 0.431 0.378 
adj. R-sq 0.251 0.271 0.502 0.468 0.508 0.477 0.427 0.374 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Decile Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 9: Panel regressions of stock price synchronicity on economy variables using different panels, which include country-
panel, decile-country panel and sector-country panel. Dependent stock price synchronicity variable is 𝑑,𝑗,𝑦 =
log  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 ) where  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2  is equal-weighted across stocks in each decile. Regression follows Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) 
in the paper. In addition to control, structural, GGI, IVOL, and LSCI variables, additional country-decile size variables of 
log average decile capitalization per firm, ACAP are included. Control variables are GDP and NSTK. Structural variables 
include geographical size, variance of GDP quarterly growth rate, industry Herfindahl index, firm Herfindahl index, and 
earnings co-movement in each country. gMCI and gSCI represent the decile-based and industry sector-based (Range) 
correlation indices, where g = (D, I) and D = Decile, and I = Sector. Numbers in the parentheses indicate the t-statistics. 
Note that there are 40 countries (denoted by subscript j), 10 deciles (denoted by a subscript d), and 30 industry sectors 
(denoted by a subscript s), and 18 years (1995 to 2012) (denoted by a subscript y) that are used in creating the panels.  
 Decile-Country Panel Industry Sector – Country Panel 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  LERW LEQR LERW LEQR LERW LEQR LERW LEQR          
GGI x gMCI / GGI x 
gSCI 
0.334*** 0.383*** 0.351*** 0.412*** 0.299*** 0.297*** 0.312*** 0.324*** 
(6.51) (5.96) (6.27) (5.90) (4.73) (4.51) (4.88) (4.89) 
DMCI / IMCI 1.313*** 1.484*** 
  
1.726*** 1.704*** 
  
 
(5.17) (4.79) 
  
(5.99) (5.79) 
  
DSCI / ISCI 
  
1.563*** 1.857*** 
  
1.727*** 1.816*** 
   
(6.08) (5.94) 
  
(6.00) (6.13) 
ACAP 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(10.26) (10.47) (10.20) (10.41) (4.44) (4.13) (4.31) (4.00) 
GGI 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.023** 0.028*** 0.026** 0.031*** 
 
(0.48) (0.44) (0.84) (0.76) (2.18) (2.80) (2.43) (3.04) 
IVOL 0.004 0.026 -0.001 0.018 -0.020 -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 
 
(0.14) (0.72) (-0.02) (0.50) (-0.58) (-0.42) (-0.39) (-0.34) 
LGDP -0.045 -0.048 -0.047 -0.049 -0.052 -0.023 -0.080 -0.049 
 
(-0.74) (-0.64) (-0.75) (-0.65) (-0.70) (-0.30) (-1.10) (-0.66) 
LNSTOCK 0.168*** 0.202*** 0.179*** 0.216*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 
 
(7.87) (7.64) (8.45) (8.20) (10.36) (9.45) (10.54) (9.72) 
Lgeo 0.195*** 0.226*** 0.190*** 0.220*** -4.648*** -4.514*** -4.521*** -4.387*** 
 
(3.77) (3.77) (3.77) (3.76) (-11.27) (-10.98) (-10.79) (-10.51) 
Vgdpg 6.876 0.425 15.250 9.968 0.485 -6.138 8.401 1.647 
 
(0.44) (0.02) (1.01) (0.51) (0.03) (-0.37) (0.53) (0.10) 
ECI 0.038 0.018 0.064 0.047 0.092 -0.003 0.111 0.014 
 
(0.27) (0.10) (0.46) (0.27) (0.56) (-0.02) (0.68) (0.08) 
IHHI -0.326 -0.300 -0.157 -0.100 -0.114 -0.102 -0.071 -0.061 
 
(-0.66) (-0.48) (-0.33) (-0.17) (-0.57) (-0.56) (-0.38) (-0.34) 
FHHI 0.448 0.424 0.371 0.338 -0.374 -0.379 -0.420 -0.410 
 
(0.66) (0.50) (0.53) (0.39) (-0.79) (-0.80) (-0.91) (-0.88) 
_cons -6.481*** -8.628*** -6.521*** -8.678*** 70.238*** 67.628*** 68.452*** 65.819*** 
 
(-13.20) (-15.06) (-12.99) (-14.79) (10.89) (10.56) (10.41) (10.09) 
         
N 7200 7200 7200 7200 15218 15218 15218 15218 
R-sq 0.516 0.480 0.521 0.485 0.438 0.383 0.440 0.386 
adj. R-sq 0.512 0.475 0.517 0.480 0.434 0.379 0.436 0.382 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 10: Panel regressions of stock price synchronicity on economy variables using different panels, which include 
country-panel, decile-country panel and sector-country panel. Dependent stock price synchronicity variable is 𝑑,𝑗,𝑦 =
log  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 ) where  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2  is equal-weighted across stocks in each decile. Regression follows Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) 
in the paper. In addition to control, structural, GGI, IVOL, and LSCI variables, additional country-decile size variables of 
log average decile capitalization per firm, ACAP are included. Control variables are GDP and NSTK. Structural variables 
include geographical size, variance of GDP quarterly growth rate, industry Herfindahl index, firm Herfindahl index, and 
earnings co-movement in each country. gSCI and gSCI represent the decile-based and industry sector-based (Range) 
correlation indices, where g = (D, I) and D = Decile, and I = Sector. GFC2008 is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 
for the post-global financial crisis period from 2008 to 2012; and otherwise 0. Numbers in the parentheses indicate the t-
statistics. Note that there are 40 countries (denoted by subscript j), 10 deciles (denoted by a subscript d), and 30 industry 
sectors (denoted by a subscript s), and 18 years (1995 to 2012) (denoted by a subscript y) that are used in creating the panels. 
 Decile-Country Panel Industry Sector – Country Panel 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  LERW LEQR LERW LEQR LERW LEQR LERW LEQR          
GFC2008 x gMCI / 
GFC2008 x gSCI 
-0.448 -0.515 0.126 0.195 0.116 0.471 0.065 0.493 
(-0.75) (-0.72) (0.21) (0.27) (0.19) (0.78) (0.11) (0.87) 
DMCI / IMCI 0.910*** 1.023*** 
  
1.298*** 1.254*** 
  
 
(3.59) (3.30) 
  
(4.35) (4.11) 
  
DSCI / ISCI 
  
1.153*** 1.374*** 
  
1.299*** 1.352*** 
   
(4.41) (4.29) 
  
(4.44) (4.47) 
ACAP 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(10.34) (10.55) (10.28) (10.48) (4.24) (3.93) (4.15) (3.82) 
GGI 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.022** 0.028*** 0.024** 0.029*** 
 
(0.71) (0.65) (0.80) (0.73) (2.08) (2.66) (2.23) (2.81) 
IVOL -0.009 0.011 -0.020 -0.004 -0.027 -0.021 -0.025 -0.022 
 
(-0.31) (0.31) (-0.67) (-0.12) (-0.78) (-0.58) (-0.71) (-0.60) 
LGDP -0.060 -0.064 -0.062 -0.067 -0.067 -0.036 -0.088 -0.059 
 
(-0.93) (-0.83) (-0.95) (-0.84) (-0.86) (-0.45) (-1.14) (-0.73) 
LNSTOCK 0.156*** 0.188*** 0.161*** 0.194*** 0.101*** 0.098*** 0.103*** 0.100*** 
 
(7.20) (7.01) (7.44) (7.25) (9.61) (8.62) (9.59) (8.58) 
Lgeo 0.179*** 0.207*** 0.176*** 0.204*** -4.524*** -4.406*** -4.457*** -4.327*** 
 
(3.40) (3.40) (3.30) (3.28) (-11.38) (-11.24) (-11.09) (-10.96) 
Vgdpg 17.018 12.031 20.289 15.857 11.897 5.067 16.461 10.469 
 
(1.11) (0.61) (1.35) (0.82) (0.76) (0.31) (1.04) (0.65) 
ECI 0.066 0.051 0.074 0.058 0.115 0.016 0.133 0.032 
 
(0.44) (0.28) (0.51) (0.32) (0.69) (0.09) (0.80) (0.19) 
IHHI -0.346 -0.323 -0.234 -0.189 -0.102 -0.087 -0.072 -0.053 
 
(-0.73) (-0.54) (-0.50) (-0.32) (-0.51) (-0.47) (-0.38) (-0.30) 
FHHI 0.322 0.280 0.199 0.138 -0.269 -0.272 -0.399 -0.369 
 
(0.48) (0.33) (0.29) (0.16) (-0.57) (-0.57) (-0.87) (-0.79) 
_cons -6.122*** -8.218*** -6.110*** -8.195*** 68.399*** 66.019*** 67.523*** 64.957*** 
 
(-12.47) (-14.32) (-12.63) (-14.55) (11.02) (10.86) (10.74) (10.59) 
         
N 7200 7200 7200 7200 15218 15218 15218 15218 
R-sq 0.504 0.470 0.507 0.473 0.430 0.377 0.431 0.378 
adj. R-sq 0.499 0.465 0.502 0.468 0.427 0.373 0.427 0.374 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 11: Panel regressions of stock price synchronicity on economy variables using different panels, which include decile-
country panel and sector-country panel. Dependent stock price synchronicity variable is 𝑑,𝑗,𝑦 = log  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 ) 
where  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2  is equal-weighted across stocks in each decile. Regression follows Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) in the paper. In addition 
to control, structural, GGI, IVOL, and LSCI variables, additional country-decile size variables of log average decile 
capitalization per firm, ACAP are included. Control variables are GDP and NSTK. Structural variables include geographical 
size, variance of GDP quarterly growth rate, industry Herfindahl index, firm Herfindahl index, and earnings co-movement 
in each country. DACI and IACI represent the average decile-based and the average industry sector-based correlation 
indices, respectively. Numbers in the parentheses indicate the t-statistics. Note that there are 40 countries (denoted by 
subscript j), 10 deciles (denoted by a subscript d), and 30 industry sectors (denoted by a subscript s), and 18 years (1995 to 
2012) (denoted by a subscript y) that are used in creating the panels. 
 Decile-Country Panel Sector-Country Panel 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  LERW LEQR LERW LEQR LERW LEQR 
DACI 1.075*** 1.430*** 1.040*** 1.298*** 
  
 
(8.49) (8.99) (6.60) (6.71) 
  
IACI 
    
0.913*** 1.053*** 
     
(8.59) (9.51) 
ACAP 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(5.60) (5.73) (6.17) (6.31) (3.28) (2.87) 
GGI 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.024** 0.030*** 
 
(0.73) (0.64) (0.75) (0.69) (2.26) (2.84) 
IVOL -0.018 -0.009 -0.017 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 
 
(-0.66) (-0.26) (-0.62) (-0.13) (-0.10) (-0.15) 
LGDP -0.051 -0.051 -0.049 -0.052 -0.083 -0.050 
 
(-0.78) (-0.65) (-0.76) (-0.66) (-1.09) (-0.65) 
LNSTOCK 0.142*** 0.170*** 0.140*** 0.163*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 
 
(6.67) (6.47) (6.65) (6.24) (9.99) (9.09) 
Lgeo 0.174*** 0.199*** 0.174*** 0.201*** -4.562*** -4.435*** 
 
(3.32) (3.27) (3.32) (3.31) (-11.30) (-10.93) 
Vgdpg 18.456 13.778 18.267 13.114 14.518 8.238 
 
(1.22) (0.71) (1.21) (0.67) (0.91) (0.50) 
ECI 0.066 0.046 0.064 0.044 0.128 0.029 
 
(0.44) (0.26) (0.44) (0.24) (0.75) (0.17) 
IHHI -0.463 -0.482 -0.483 -0.543 -0.116 -0.115 
 
(-1.00) (-0.83) (-1.02) (-0.91) (-0.60) (-0.63) 
FHHI -0.326 -0.570 -0.222 -0.424 -0.808 -0.838 
 
(-0.48) (-0.68) (-0.34) (-0.51) (-1.48) (-1.48) 
_cons -6.078*** -8.141*** -6.100*** -8.225*** 69.171*** 66.636*** 
 
(-12.48) (-14.34) (-12.60) (-14.57) (10.95) (10.56)        
N 7200 7200 7200 7200 15218 15218 
R-sq 0.518 0.486 0.519 0.488 0.436 0.385 
adj. R-sq 0.513 0.481 0.514 0.483 0.432 0.381 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Decile Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 12: Panel regressions of stock price synchronicity on economy variables using firm-level panel. Dependent stock 
price synchronicity variable is 𝑑,𝑗,𝑦 = log  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2 ) where  𝑅𝑑,𝑗,𝑦
2  is equal-weighted across stocks in each decile. 
Regression follows Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) in the paper. In addition to control, structural, GGI, IVOL, and LSCI variables, 
additional country-decile size variables of log average decile capitalization per firm, ACAP are included. Control variables 
are GDP and NSTK. Structural variables include geographical size, variance of GDP quarterly growth rate, industry 
Herfindahl index, firm Herfindahl index, and earnings co-movement in each country. gMCI and gSCI represent the decile-
based and industry sector-based (Range) correlation indices, where g = (D, I) and D = Decile, and I = Sector. DACI and 
IACI represent the average decile-based and the average industry sector-based correlation indices, respectively. Numbers 
in the parentheses indicate the t-statistics.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  LRSQ LRSQ LRSQ LRSQ      
DMCI 2.249*** 
   
 
(5.09) 
   
DSCI 
 
2.321*** 
  
  
(5.39) 
  
DACI 
  
2.646*** 
 
   
(11.47) 
 
IACI 
   
2.035***     
(8.74) 
size 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 
(6.77) (6.78) (3.72) (6.78) 
GGI 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 
 
(3.24) (3.23) (3.17) (3.27) 
IVOL -0.059 -0.063 -0.085 -0.049 
 
(-1.03) (-1.09) (-1.58) (-0.87) 
LGDP 0.419*** 0.380*** 0.412*** 0.361** 
 
(2.88) (2.66) (2.91) (2.53) 
Lgeo -7.930*** -7.791*** -7.934*** -7.871*** 
 
(-21.28) (-20.87) (-21.05) (-21.17) 
Vgdpg -5.416 0.168 -2.259 -1.093 
 
(-0.29) (0.01) (-0.12) (-0.06) 
ECI 0.121 0.117 0.127 0.119 
 
(0.45) (0.44) (0.49) (0.44) 
ihhi -0.024 0.050 -0.102 -0.046 
 
(-0.16) (0.32) (-0.70) (-0.31) 
fhhi 2.299*** 2.233*** -0.556 1.672** 
 
(2.65) (2.60) (-0.71) (2.05) 
stk_ret -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 -0.008 
 
(-1.17) (-1.19) (-1.55) (-1.23) 
stk_std -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.076*** -0.123*** 
 
(-9.16) (-9.14) (-6.34) (-9.26) 
_cons 116.572*** 114.757*** 116.682*** 116.214***  
(21.48) (20.96) (21.17) (21.40)      
N 475701 475701 475701 475701 
R-sq 0.238 0.238 0.246 0.240 
adj. R-sq 0.238 0.238 0.246 0.239 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Sector Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES 
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Figures: 1 a, b, c, d  Error-Weighted Stock Price Synchronicity ERW is plotted against Good Government Index 
for 40 Countries in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010. GGI incorporates the “corruption perception index” (CPI) published by 
Transparency International and a component indicator representing “property right” in the Index of Economic 
Freedom (IEF), an index jointly published by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation. The two series 
add up to a score between 0 and 20 for the GGI. Higher GGI denotes a higher observance of investor property right 
in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Note: Graphically, EQW plots versus GGI do not show any significant variation from these ERW plots, so they are 
not reported here to economize on space. 
  
                       Figure 1a      Figure 1b 
                       Figure 1c      Figure 1d 
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Figure 2a: The figure shows 8 panels with plots of time-averaged estimated coefficients ?̂?1,𝑑𝑗 + ?̂?2,𝑑𝑗 in years 
1995-2000, 2001-2006, and 2007-2012 versus the 1st decile to the 10th decile in terms of firm capitalizations in 
each of the indicated country. The plots are normalized to start at 1 by dividing by  ?̂?1,1𝑗 + ?̂?2,1𝑗. The examples 
of U.S., U.K., France, Holland, Australia, Italy, Germany, and Hong Kong are representative of developed 
countries.  
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Figure 2b: The figure shows 8 panels with plots of time-averaged estimated coefficients ?̂?1,𝑑𝑗 + ?̂?2,𝑑𝑗 in years 
1995-2000, 2001-2006, and 2007-2012 versus the 1st decile to the 10th decile in terms of firm capitalizations in 
each of the indicated country. The plots are normalized to start at 1 by dividing by?̂?1,1𝑗 + ?̂?2,1𝑗. The examples 
of Turkey, Peru, Poland, India, Indonesia, Czech, China, and Taiwan are representative of developing countries.  
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Appendix 1: List of Key Variables and their symbols 
Description Abbreviations 
Error Weighted stock price synchronicity (R2) ERW 
Log-Transform of ERW LERW 
Equal Weighted Stock Price Synchronicity (R2) EQW 
Log-Transform of EQW LEQW 
Log-per capita GDP  GDP 
Log number of listed stock in country j NSTK 
Log-Geography Size GEO 
Variance of GDP Growth VGDP 
Industry-level Herfindahl Index IHHI 
Country-level Herfindahl Index FHHI 
Earning co-movement index ECI 
Good Government index GGI 
Log-Average Market Capitalization of Stocks in Country j ACAP 
Local Stock Index Volatility IVOL 
Decile-Based Medium Correlation Index DMCI 
Decile-Based Range Correlation Index DSCI 
Sector-Based Medium Correlation Index IMCI 
Sector-Based Range Correlation Index ISCI 
 
Note: The table summarizes the list of variables used in the empirical tests. They are represented by 
the abbreviations as shown on the right-hand column.  
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Appendix 2: Industry Sector Classification  
Sector Code Industry Description 
1 Food Food Products 
2 Beer Beer & Liquor 
3 Smoke Tobacco Products 
4 Games Recreation 
5 Books Printing and Publishing 
6 Hshld Consumer Goods 
7 Clths Apparel 
8 Hlth Healthcare, Medical Equipment, Pharmaceutical Products 
9 Chems Chemicals 
10 Txtls Textiles 
11 Cnstr Construction and Construction Materials 
12 Steel Steel Works Etc 
13 FabPr Fabricated Products and Machinery 
14 ElcEq Electrical Equipment 
15 Autos Automobiles and Trucks 
16 Carry Aircraft, ships, and railroad equipment 
17 Mines Precious Metals, Non-Metallic, and Industrial Metal Mining 
18 Coal Coal 
19 Oil Petroleum and Natural Gas 
20 Util Utilities 
21 Telcm Communication 
22 Servs Personal and Business Services 
23 BusEq Business Equipment 
24 Paper Business Supplies and Shipping Containers 
25 Trans Transportation 
26 Whlsl Wholesale 
27 Rtail Retail 
28 Meals Restaraunts, Hotels, Motels 
29 Fin Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, Trading 
30 Other Everything Else 
  
Note: the table shows a list of 30 industry sectors classified in the Professor French’s 
website.  
Source: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_30_ind_port_old.html 
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Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics for Different Panels 
 
Variable Observation Mean S.D. Min 25%tile Mdn 75%tile Max 
i) Country Level:         
EQR 720 0.070 0.050 0.020 0.040 0.050 0.090 0.400 
EWR 720 0.070 0.050 0.010 0.040 0.050 0.090 0.410 
LEQR 720 -2.700 0.630 -4.040 -3.170 -2.880 -2.260 -0.420 
LEWR 720 -2.770 0.650 -4.860 -3.220 -2.920 -2.340 -0.370 
DMCI 720 0.160 0.090 0.000 0.090 0.140 0.200 0.620 
DSCI 720 0.140 0.100 0.000 0.070 0.110 0.180 0.620 
LGDP 720 9.380 1.290 5.970 8.450 9.910 10.390 11.510 
LNSTOCK 720 5.450 1.460 1.390 4.540 5.390 6.450 9.050 
LGEO 720 12.620 2.060 6.540 11.440 12.650 13.720 16.030 
VGDPG 720 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 
ECI 720 0.290 0.110 0.020 0.210 0.270 0.350 0.780 
GGI 720 13.170 4.270 3.200 10.060 13.400 17.230 19.600 
IHHI 720 0.180 0.100 0.060 0.110 0.140 0.210 0.720 
FHHI 720 0.070 0.080 0.000 0.020 0.040 0.080 0.650 
IVOL 720 1.630 0.720 0.460 1.130 1.500 1.990 5.560 
ACAP(billions US$) 720 4.170 5.100 0.030 1.040 2.080 5.300 35.430 
ii) Decile Level 
        
EQR 7200 0.070 0.060 0.000 0.040 0.050 0.090 0.590 
EWR 7200 0.070 0.060 0.000 0.030 0.050 0.090 0.600 
LEQR 7200 -2.780 0.760 -9.580 -3.230 -2.870 -2.330 0.380 
LEWR 7200 -4.220 0.980 -12.010 -4.810 -4.310 -3.630 -0.030 
DACI 7200 0.140 0.130 0.000 0.040 0.100 0.210 0.890 
IACI 7200 0.140 0.110 0.000 0.070 0.110 0.190 0.740 
ACAP 7200 3.710 15.540 0.000 0.050 0.170 0.720 210.800 
IHHI(decile disagg) 7200 0.030 0.060 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.030 0.690 
FHHI(decile disagg) 7200 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.520 
DMCI 7200 0.150 0.090 0.000 0.090 0.130 0.200 0.620 
DSCI 7200 0.140 0.100 0.000 0.070 0.110 0.180 0.620 
LNSTOCK 7200 3.130 1.460 -1.100 2.200 3.090 4.190 7.020 
iii) Sector Level 
        
EQR 15218 0.070 0.060 0.000 0.040 0.050 0.090 0.800 
EWR 15218 0.070 0.060 0.000 0.030 0.050 0.090 0.800 
LEQR 15218 -2.820 0.840 -10.330 -3.310 -2.860 -2.320 1.390 
LEWR 15218 -2.910 0.920 -11.350 -3.450 -2.930 -2.350 1.390 
DACI 15218 0.150 0.110 0.000 0.060 0.120 0.200 0.660 
IACI 15218 0.150 0.140 0.000 0.050 0.110 0.210 0.980 
ACAP 15218 2.540 7.530 0.000 0.180 0.530 1.790 160.990 
IHHI(sector disagg) 15218 0.010 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.690 
FHHI(sector disagg) 15218 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.530 
IMCI 15218 0.150 0.090 0.000 0.080 0.130 0.200 0.620 
ISCI 15218 0.140 0.100 0.000 0.070 0.110 0.180 0.620 
LNSTOCK 15218 2.340 1.300 0.690 1.390 2.200 3.140 7.490 
iv) Firm Level 
        
RSQ 475701 0.060 0.080 0.000 0.010 0.030 0.080 0.980 
DACI 475701 0.130 0.110 0.000 0.040 0.090 0.190 0.890 
IACI 475701 0.120 0.100 0.000 0.050 0.080 0.170 0.980 
STK_RET(%) 475701 -0.140 1.370 -5.170 -0.700 -0.020 0.520 4.180 
STK_STD(%) 475701 0.790 0.730 0.000 0.400 0.610 0.960 30.340 
SIZE(billions US$) 475701 4.770 53.250 0.000 0.030 0.150 0.670 3765.040 
IHHI(firm disagg) 475701 0.020 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.690 
FHHI(firm disagg) 475701 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.620 
DMCI 475701 0.130 0.090 -0.050 0.060 0.110 0.170 0.620 
DSCI 475701 0.120 0.090 -0.030 0.050 0.080 0.160 0.620 
 
Note: Table contains descriptive statistics for different panels, which include country-panel, decile-panel, industry-sector 
panel and firm level panel. The statistics include mean, standard deviation (S.D.), minimum, 25 percentile, medium, 75 
percentile and maximum.  
 
